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THE CONCEPT OF COST OF PRODUCTION IN AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL
POLICY - WITH SPECIFIC APPLICATION TO THE WHEAT INDUSTRY
Introduction
One feature of Australian agricultural policy in 
the post World War II era has been the introduction of cost- 
based price stabilization schemes for certain of our rural 
industries.
Currently there are four such stabilization schemes 
under which the price of the industry’s product is related 
to costs of production. The products involved are wheat, 
butterfat (for butter and cheese production), sugar and 
dried vine fruits.
The Wheat Industry
The first wheat industry stabilization scheme 
under peacetime arrangements commenced with the 1948-49 
season and ran for five years: second, third and fourth 
stabilization schemes, each of five years duration, which 
have continued the policy of basing prices on assessed cost 
of production in respect of home consumption and a specified 
quantity of exports, have since been enacted. The present 
(fourth) scheme will terminate with the 1967-68 season.
The main features of the current scheme are as
follows:
. the Australian Wheat Board is constituted as the 
sole authority for the marketing of wheat within 
Australia and for the marketing of wheat and flour 
for export from Australia.
. the price of wheat is guaranteed, the guarantee covering 
wheat consumed locally plus 150 million bushels of 
export wheat.
. the guaranteed price for 1963-54 was set at 14/5d. per 
bushel bulk basis f.o.r. ports which is to be adjusted
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in succeeding years according to movements in 
production costs.
. a stabilization fund was created into which growers 
contributions towards the financing of the guaranteed 
price, are paid. For this purpose funds are collected 
by means of an export tax equal to the excess of 
export returns over the guaranteed return up to a 
maximum of l/6d. per bushel. A ceiling of £30 
million is set on growers’ contributions to this fund.
. the home consumption price of wheat is fixed by State 
legislation and is based on the guaranteed price.
. a loading on the price of all wheat sold for consumption 
in Australia is made to cover the cost of transporting 
wheat from the Mainland to Tasmania each season. The 
present loading is 2d. a bushel.
. a premium on wheat exported from Western Australia 
is payable to producers in recognition of the freight 
advantage to overseas markets enjoyed by producers 
in that State. The premium is basedon the actual 
freight advantage up to a maximum of 3d. a bushel.
The Dairy Industry
To encourage an expansion of production of dairy 
produce during the last war, the Commonwealth Government 
introduced a system under which the producer was guaranteed 
a price based on production costs for all milk used in 
manufacturing. This system which was accompanied by subsidies 
and price control was subsequently expanded into the first 
five year stabilization scheme.
In this scheme which commenced in 1947, the 
guaranteed price in respect of the commercial butter equivalent 
of butter, cheese and processed milk was fixed on the basis 
of assessed cost of production.
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In the second five-year scheme, which began in 
1952, the price guarantee was related to a proportion of 
butter and cheese production which was determined on the 
basis of the level of home consumption each year plus 20$ 
of this level. Provision was also made under this scheme 
for the establishment of an independent body to advise the 
Government on the guaranteed price. Under its terms of 
reference, this body (the Dairy Industry Investigation 
Committee) was to take demand as well as cost considerations 
into account (a reflection of growing concern at the 
resistance of domestic consumers to increased prices). In 
1955/56 the Government introduced the principle of a fixed 
amount of subsidy which in that year was set at £14.5 
million. In the following year it was set at £13.5 million 
and it has remained at this level ever since.
The third five-year stabilization scheme had the 
same basic features as its predecessor. In the fourth (and 
current) scheme, however, the Government has handed the 
responsibility for price fixation on the domestic market back 
to the dairy industry but continues to assess movements in 
industry costs of production for the industry's use as a 
guide to the fixation of domestic prices.
In 1948-49 a dairy industry stabilization fund was 
established into which amounts realized on butter and cheese 
exports in excess of the f.o.b. equivalent of the guaranteed 
ex-factory prices were paid.
Payments into the Fund were made in each season 
up to 1950-51 and in June 1951 the balance stood at £3.9 
million. In the 1951-52 season the deficiency on exports of 
both butter and cheese was covered by payments from the Fund, 
the balance at June 1952 being reduced to £2.9 million. From
1952-53 onwards, although export prices of "butter and cheese 
were below the guaranteed prices, the Fund was only drawn 
on to increase the average equalisation rate for cheese in the 
seasons up to and including 1953-54 and for butter in respect 
of the 1954-55 season. In 1957 new legislation empowered 
the Board to use the Fund for any other purpose approved by 
the Minister. The balance in the Fund in June 1963 amounted 
to £2.2 million.
It will be evident from this that the Fund has not 
paid an important role in stabilizing returns to producers.
The Sugar Industry
For many years the production of cane sugar in 
Australia has been strictly controlled. This has been made 
necessary by the specific quota provisions of the 
International Sugar Agreement, to which Australia has been a 
signatory, limiting exports from members countries.
On the domestic market the price of refined sugar 
is fixed in relation to the cost of production of sugarcane 
and milling costs.
On the export market a considerable proportion 
of Australian sugar is sold under the terms of the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement on the basis of annually 
negotiated prices. Over a period of years these prices 
have been very favourable.
When the Australian price of sugar is higher than 
the world ruling price, Australian exporters of products 
containing sugar, e.g. jams, canned fruits, condensed milk, 
etc. are granted a rebate on the cane sugar content of products 
exported. This is done to remove the price disadvantage 
suffered by Australian processors. The rate of the rebate is 
the excess, if any, of the Australian sugar price over the
6.
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estimated cost of the cheapest available foreign sugar 
landed, duty free, in Australia.
A domestic sugar rebate of £2.4.0 per ton is 
paid on the cane sugar content of approved fruit products 
manufactured in Australia irrespective of whether the 
products are for home consumption or for export. The rebate 
is designed to assist the manufactured fruits industry and 
is payable only where manufacturers pay not less than 
established minimum prices for their fruit. The domestic 
sugar rebate is deducted from any export rebate if the 
approved fruit products are subsequently exported.
The Dried Vine Fruits Industry
A five year stabilization scheme for the dried vine 
fruits industry was introduced in 1964.
Under this scheme -
. contributions are made by growers into a separate 
fund for each variety when average realisations of 
domestic and export sales exceed the assessed cost 
of production by £5 per ton subject to a limit on 
contributions of £10 per ton.
. the quantities guaranteed in each season are:
75,000 tons of sultanas, 13>500 tons of currants 
and 11,000 tons of raisins.
. payments are not made by growers into the funds, 
irrespective of average realisations, if a season’s 
production does not exceed 50,000 tons of sultanas, 
8,000 tons of currants or 6,000 tons of raisins - a 
provision designed to meet the situation where overall 
industry returns are low.
. where a particular stabilization fund is without
adequate funds or has no funds at all, the Commonwealth
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has agreed to contribute whatever funds are necessary 
to raise average returns to £5 per ton below costs of 
production. However, if industry contributions 
subsequently raise the funds above the limits of 
£500,000 for currants and raisins and £2,000,000 for 
sultanas, the Commonwealth would first be reimbursed, 
to the extent that funds were available, contributions 
previously made by it.
As average production of dried vine fruits in the 
ten year period ending 1963 averaged 60,600 tons in respect 
of sultanas, 10,500 tons in respect of currants and 8,000 
tons in respect of raisins, all or a large proportion of each 
crop is likely to come within the terms of the guarantee.
Each of the abovementioned schemes it will be seen 
has its own special features tailored to its industry's 
particular circumstances. For this reason the consideration 
of cost-based pricing policy in Australian agriculture is 
more appropriately attempted on an industry-by-industry basis. 
Accordingly, in this paper, attention will be concentrated on 
one industry, namely, the wheat industry.
Part I will be devoted to a discussion of the 
policy and its effects and Part II to an appraisal of the 
concepts and methodology employed in assessing the cost of 
production of wheat for the purpose of determining guaranteed 
prices. In this latter context we shall need to establish 
whether a genuine cost figure is in fact being assessed and 
whether it is consistent with the policy objective.
Appendix I sets out the assessed cost figures in 
respect of the first three wheat industry stabilization schemes 
and in Appendix II the method by which the base cost and base 
cost structure for a stabilization scheme is derived from 
basic survey data, is demonstrated.
PART I APPRAISAL OF WHEAT STABILIZATION POLICY
Evolution of Policy
The introduction of wheat price stabilization 
after the second world war may well be regarded as a 
consequence of the disastrous financial experiences of wheat- 
growers in the 1930'S.
In the previous decade the industry had expanded 
steadily under the influence of land settlement schemes for 
soldiers, migrants and others by State Governments and in 
the economic crisis of 1929-30 farmers were urged to increase 
their acreages in an endeavour to sustain foreign currency 
earnings. However in 1930-31 world wheat prices collapsed 
falling to less than half of the average prices ruling in the 
second half of the 1920's. The fall in price is indicated 
in the following table.
Wheat Prices Per Bushel F.o.r. Principal Australian Shipping Ports
S. D. S. D.
1918-19 5 • 1927-28 5. H
1919-20 8. 8i 1928-29 if. 9i
1 8. 6i 1929-30 H-. 3i
2 5. 5 1 2. H
3 5. 2i 2 3. 2
k 4. 9i 3 2.1 of
5 6. 6 rv> 00 lfr|H
6 6. 2f 1938-39 2. 8
7 5. 3i 1939-to 2. 6
Source : C.B.C.S.
The effect on wheat growers was catastrophic. 
During the expansion of the 1920's when acreage increased 
from 9.1m. acres^tc/ 15»0m. acres in 1929-30 and to 18.2m. 
acres in the following year, large amounts of capital were 
borrowed. Credit was easy, debts were high, the evidence 
indicating extravagant expenditure on machinery equipment
and high priced land. Only the very prudent remained free(1 \of substantial debt.
It will be seen from the above table that the 
weakening trend in prices evident towards the end of the 
1920's turned into a collapse in 1931 with no real recovery 
in the ensuring years. There was a partial recovery in the 
mid 1930's but this was not sustained and in the immediate 
pre-war period prices were again weakened badly and further 
emergency assistance was extended to growers.
The Royal Commission set up to enquire into and report 
on the Wheat, Flour and Bread Industries indicated, in its first 
report, that the industry was in a serious financial position 
and that wheat growing was unprofitable at the prices ruling 
in the 1930's. The Commission recommended emergency measures 
for the adjustment of wheat growers debts and the adoption of 
a stable home consumption price for wheat by means of an 
excise tax on flour exports.
In its second report the Commission made the 
following abservations.
. The Australian wheat problem is merely part of 
a great world problem which affects all kinds of 
agricultural production and has rapidly and 
radically changed the economic outlook for more 
than 70% of producers in the world.
. It is impossible for an industry to experience
such a reverse without undergoing severe strain, 
and the social system of primary producing 
countries cannot be expected to endure indefinitely 
the consequent economic distress;
. there was a serious gap between cost of production 
and (then) current prices;
. the progressive submergence of rural producers 
under accumulating debts, constitutes a 
political problem of the first order in every 
wheat exporting country; 1
(1) First Report of Royal Commission on Wheat, Flour and Bread Industries.
. constructive planning to save a grave situation
has become increasingly urgent in every country 
which relies on the exports of primary 
commodities.
The Commission considered that the broad lines 
of action for future wheat policy should be
. maximum Australian contribution to revive
international trade;
. review of costs including debts and interest
to establish the extent of relief required;
. agricultural re-organization,. efficient farming
practices, avoidance of increased average 
production;
. world wide agreements.
As regards international agreements the Commission 
noted that many devices had been introduced to alleviate the 
burden of depressed prices (e.g. import quotas, production control^ 
increased tariffs, bounties and exchange control) but pointed out 
that these had had adverse effects via diminished trade on the 
problems of exporters. . .
The Commission concluded that abnormal stocks were 
the immediate cause of the collapse in wheat prices, accentrctated 
by the bounteous harvest of 1928. It also noted that the 
principle of protecting the home producer of primary products 
from export price fluctuations has been adopted as a cardinal 
point of policy in many countries and that this had resulted 
in an expansion of production.
Indicative of the widespread nature of the economic 
reverses of wheatgrowers is reflected in the fact that in the 
two years 1930 and 1931 sixteen international conferences 
dealing primarily with wheat or having wheat as a principal 
matter were held. These were followed by a world Economic 
Conference in 1933 - 1
(1) Second Report of Royal Commission Wheat, Flour and 
Bread Industries.
Referring to the gravity of the growers' financial(i)
position, Dunsdorf indicated that half of their income
(excluding bounties) had to be paid to creditors the remainder 
giving farmers an income equal to bjfo of an agricultural 
labourer's wage and nothing for interest on equity.
Whilst the second world war rescued farmers from 
a deepening recession the long years of economic crises in the 
1930's were not to be forgotten and soon after the war ended the 
Australian Wheat Growers Federation at its 19^6 Conference 
passed the following resolution:
“That the Federal Government set up a commission of 
enquiry on which the wheatgrowers shall have adequate 
representation, to ascertain the cost of producing a 
bushel of wheat. The figures to be indexed in a 
similar manner to the index used in the cost of living 
figures. The guaranteed floor price to be the cost of 
production as determined by the commission with 
provision for a review every year to relate the price 
to any rise or fall in the cost of production".
Nor did the Government have any illusions about
future prospects for trade in Wheat. Thus in a statement of 
current Commonwealth policy on agriculture the Prime Minister
of Australia, in 19^-6, indicated
were expected to be very temporary. This degree of pessimism 
would seem to have been strongly influenced by recollections 
of the post-world war I recession in prices and the position 
of oversupply in the 1930's.
In the same statement the Prime Minister laid down
the objective of agricultural policy. The first of the general 
objectives was "to raise and make more secure the levels of 
living enjoyed by those engaged in and dependent upon the 
primary industries" and in more specific terms the policy aimed, 
inter alia, "to provide greater flexibility and security of 
farmery'incomes". By this the government indicated that welfare 
objectives were to be an integral part of agricultural policy. 1
(1) J.B. Chifley: A Sural Policy for Post-war Australia.
In view of this statement of policy it was not 
surprising that the proposal of the Wheatgrowers' Federation 
was sympathetically received. In due course the Government 
announced its approval and set up a Committee to inquire 
into and report upon:
(a) the reasonable costs of wheat production per 
bushel in the main wheatgrowing districts of 
the Commonwealth and,
(b) whether basic items of cost could be 
established as an index to periodical 
variations in the cost of production of 
wheat".
This Committee conducted a postal survey of wheat 
farms in respect of the five years ended 191+6/!+7. The survey 
was followed by hearings of evidence from farmers who had 
completed the questionnaires, the purpose being to check the 
accuracy of the information. Subsequently the Committee 
reported that the average cost of growing wheat in the 
Commonwealth was 6/- per bushel at sidings and that measurement 
of movements in costs was possible using an index.
The Government however did not accept the Committee’s 
findings in full and in January 19^8 the Minister announced 
that from January 19*+8 to the conclusion of the 1951/52 wheat 
crop the Commonwealth Government would guarantee a price of 6/3 
a bushel bulk f.o.r. ports for all wheat sold by the Australian 
Wheat Board for consumption within Australia and for all wheat 
exported.
The Minister referred to the Committee’s cost finding
as follows:
"The Committee found a cost figure of 6/- per 
bushel at sidings. Conversion of this price to 
a bulk f.o.r. ports basis indicated a price of 
6/8d. per bushel. Having regard to the long 
range security provided and the profitable return 
to a reasonably efficient producer, the Government 
adopted 6/3d. per bushel f.o.r. ports as a fair 
proposition to all concerned".
At a conference in Canberra early in 19^8 the 
Australian Wheat-grower1s Federation accepted the price of 
6/3d. with the reservation that it should be subject to the 
application of an index number indicating a rise or fall in 
production costs.
In June 19*+8 the Commonwealth informed a conference 
of State Ministers of agriculture that the Commonwealth was 
prepared to guarantee 6/3d. a bushel on all export wheat 
plus any increase in the cost of production determined by an 
index.
Soon after this Conference the possibility arose 
that the International Wheat Agreement which with its guaranteed 
purchases within a defined range of prices provided a major 
supporting measure for the Governments’ price guarantee to 
producers, might not be ratified. A further conference of State 
Ministers was then held.
It was agreed at this latter conference that the 
Commonwealth guarantee should apply to wheat used for home 
consumption in Australia and up to 100 million bushels of 
wheat exported. The Conference also agreed inter alia,
. that the Commonwealth Government shall guarantee 
a price of 6/3d. a bushel f.o.r. ports bulk 
basis for wheat grown and delivered by wheat 
growers;
. that the guaranteed price shall vary according 
to an index of production costs for each season 
staring with the 19*+8/^9 crop; and 
. that the guarantee shall apply to the wheat 
crop marketed through approved organisations 
for the period up to the end of the 1952/53 
season.
This agreement formed the basis of the Wheat 
Industry Stabilization Act 19^8 and the complementary State 
legislation.
/S'.
In introducing the Wheat Industry Stabilization
Bill in the House of Representatives in October 19^+6, the
Minister declared that the outstanding objective of the plan
was nto ensure the wheatgrower against the serious hardships
that comes from falls in the world* s wheat price’* and that
“the movement in prices of wheat, or indeed, of any primary
product, have little relation to changes in costs of 11)
production" .
The central feature of the plan he added "is that
there will be a guaranteed nrice to growers based upon costs(2)of production" which would be reviewed annually.
The Minister went on to say that "There are too 
many factors affecting the growers' prosperity which are 
outside of growers' control that wheat growing has been too 
much of a gamble".
In discussing the notion of a home consumption 
price for wheat completely divorced from export prices the 
Minister said -
"Our domestic wheat price will not follow erratic 
export prices up and down the scale. That system 
ruined growers in the past, and gave no great 
benefit to consumers. A reasonable, stabilized 
price in the long run is a better policy. The 
principles behind the plan, therefore, is that our 
wheat growers are entitled to a fair return for the 
wheat they sell in Australia, and that, on the 
other hand, the Australian user should not be 
exploited. Allied to this is the principle that <*n 
important industry producing essential food, 
should be given reasonable security. Where the 
export marketing includes undue risk, it is 
justifiable for the community to give a guarantee 
to guard the industry against that risk."
(1)
(2)
(3)
Hansard Vol. 198 19^8 p1^+9
» tt it tt tt
it tt I t» P1451
Then years later the Minister for Primary Industry 
presented the Third Wheat Industry Stabilization Bill to 
Parliament which did not differ fundamentally from the 
schemes that preceded it. Certain changes in the cost formula 
were proposed, the one relating to yields having a downward 
influence on costs, the other relating to the valuation of land 
having an upward influence. The new legislative proposals also 
provided for a stabilization fund to be financed by growers 
up to a limit of £20 million beyond which refunds would be 
made on a first-in first-out basis.
In the fourth and current scheme, the cost formula 
was again modified to take into account the rising trend in 
average , yields in the industry. This resulted in a sharp drop 
in the guaranteed price in 1963-61+ but the industry had the 
satisfaction of having the guaranteed price extended to 150m. 
bushels of exports, instead of the 100m. bushels in the previous 
schemes. At the same time the limit of growers' contributions 
to the stabilization fund was raised to £30 million.
It is evident from the foregoing that the Government 
was determined to avoid future disruptive effects of widely 
fluctuating world wheat prices on the wheat producer. It is 
evident too that the Government intended to give effect to 
its policy of reasonable incomes through the medium of 
guaranteed cost-based wheat prices. This, it should be noted, 
is a welfare objective which cannot be reconciled with 
traditional price theory and which therefore involves a social 
cost to the community.
In this regard the Government was cautious about 
establishing stabilized prices based on assessed costs of 
production. This was indicated by its refusal to accept the 
wheat cost of Production Committee's recommendation for a 
guaranteed price of 6/8d. a bushel f.o.r. Further, in the 
Prime Ministers 19^6 statement on agricultural policy, (page 8) 
he warned about the limitations of cost surveys and stated the
Governments’ aim was to set a price level that would 
reasonably compensate efficient production. These attitudes 
were consistent with the findings of the Rural Reconstruction 
Commission which recognised that it was impossible by domestic 
policy alone to stabilize prices at a high level for the entire 
output of the principal export industries and that international 
collaboration was essential. The Commission did however support 
the view that a guaranteed home consumption price related to 
general economic conditions could be worked out to give a 
measure of stabilization even if there were no international 
stabilization but it did not favour rigid price guarantees.
Resource Allocation
In this sector we shall consider what constitutes 
equilibrium in product and factor markets, discuss the 
theory of rent in relation to resource allocation and the 
implications this has for a cost-based price guarantee, and 
consider to what extent misallocation of resources has 
occurred as a result of the guaranteed cost-based price in 
the wheat industry.
(a) Conditions for Equilibrium in Product and Factor 
Markets.
Under conditions of pure competition the price of 
a commodity is determined by demand and supply forces inter­
acting upon each other. A price determined in this way is 
an equilibrium price; that is to say, it is one which will 
satisfy the existing conditions of demand and supply. Thus, 
if in one position of equilibrium, the conditions of either 
demand or supply change, the market price, as the 
equilibrating factor in the movement of demand and supply 
into a new position of market equilibrium, must also change. 
If, for example, supply increased relative to demand, the 
equilibrium price would, assuming the elasticity of demand 
was less than infinite, be lower than in the original 
situation; if on the other hand demand increased relative 
to supply the reverse would hold assuming an imperfectly 
elastic supply.
When market equilibrium is disturbed by a change 
in dupply or demand conditions, supply and demand forces 
set up a movement towards a new permanent position of 
equilibrium in respect of those conditions. However, this 
movement cannot be achieved instantaneously; in fact, it 
may only be achieved over a long period of time. In the 
interim, the market takes up a series of temporary short 
term equilibrium positions.
As all short period equilibrium positions lack 
the same key characteristic of the long period, namely, 
complete adaptation of supply to changed demand conditions, 
it is usual for expositional purposes to refer to only one 
short period equilibrium position.
Short period equilibrium occurs when in response 
to, say, an increase in price all producers increase their 
output with their existing fixed resource supply until the 
marginal cost of each producer is equal to the market price 
of the product. When this condition is satisfied the volume 
of supply will equal the volume of demand.
This state of equilibrium is no#, however, a 
permanent one since producers have not achieved the position 
at which they maximize their profits. Only after sufficient 
time has elapsed for supply conditions (factor markets) to 
fully adapt to the new demand conditions will they reach 
their long period equilibrium position where profits are 
maximized. This will occur where the marginal cost and 
average cost of each producer is equated with price.
This equilibrium position necessarily implies that 
the prices of each resource used in the production process are 
themselves equilibrium prices. This can only occur when the 
marginal rate of substitution of one factor for another is 
equal between producing units i.e. a producer will increase his 
hire of each resource up to the point where the last increment 
of a value-unit of one resource adds to his product an amount 
equal to the marginal revenue product of a value-unit of each 
other resource.
Industry equilibrium is therefore only achieved 
when the conditions for equilibrium in both product and 
factor markets have been satisfied.
When the price of a product, say, falls, the demand 
for resources used in production of that product will, cet, par,,
be reduced; this will cause the prices of the resources to 
decline, the effect on the price of each resource depending 
upon its respective elasticities of supply and demand which 
in turn are affected by its elasticity of substitution.
Changes in prices of products are thus translated into changes 
in incomes to factors.
It will therefore be apparent that given an 
arbitrarily fixed price for the product of an industry, 
which is higher than the free market price of that product, 
the incomes of one or more factors engaged in that industry 
will be equal to the marginal value productivity of these 
factors in other industries and therefore in excess of its 
or their theoretical earnings in that industry under free 
market conditions. Moreover, the marginal revenue productivity 
of each factor in the industry would be less than the marginal 
revenue productivity of resources employed in other industry 
and thus the resources would contribute less to aggregate 
national product than they would if they were employed in these 
other industries. Resources are not therefore allocated in 
the most efficient manner.
Fixing prices above their free market level not only 
results in lower total product because of the misallocation of 
resources, it also removes the income incentive for resources 
to move into industries where their marginal revenue productivity 
is maximized thereby tending to create a permanent structural 
fault in the economy.
In the opposite situation where the fixed price of 
a product is below its market price, production will be carried 
to the point where the marginal value productivity of each 
resource is the same as in other industries. This will 
represent a lower level of production than would result if 
market prices prevailed for the reason that with the higher 
price rents would appear and the marginal revenue productivity 
would rise above the marginal value productivity of resources
in other industries so that for a time each new resource 
entering the industry (as well as existing resources in the 
industry) would contribute more to total product than is 
lost by its withdrawal from other industry.
Although, in the following section, we shall 
consider in more detail the part rent plays in the allocation 
of resources and its significance in terms of cost based 
prices, it will be already clear that with arbitrarily fixed 
prices the allocation of resources through the supply responses 
of factors to these fixed product prices will not be carried to 
the point at which total production is maximized and the 
resulting loss in production is the social cost to the community 
resulting from its failure to allocate its resources in the 
most efficient manner.
(b) Theory of Rent
If the price of a product is to be fixed on the 
basis of its unit cost of production, it is essential that 
the price fixer should have a proper appreciation of the 
relationship of rent to cost. Moreover such a policy of 
interference with the price mechanism in agriculture has 
very important implications with respect to the allocation 
of resources. In the following discussion we shall, inter 
alia, see how rents act as an allocative force attracting 
resources into or away from a particular industry according 
as the demand for the product of that industry increases or 
decreases.
The theory of rent, which in its development by 
the classical school, was identified solely with payments for 
the use of land, has now been developed into a generalized 
theory with application and relevance to any factor of 
production in imperfectly elastic supply.
Stonier and Hague define rent in the following
terms :-
Rent can therefore be defined, more accurately 
than we have done so far, as the difference 
between the reward to any factor of production 
in imperfectly elastic supply with respect to 
changes in its prices and its transfer earnings (1).
Rent may therefore be earned by labour, capital and
enterprise (entrepreneural earnings). In general, rents of
labour and capital have a characteristic feature which is
much less common to land and enterprise. This is that the
rents are normally earned only in the short term and tend to
disappear in the long run, when the supply of the factor has
had time to respond to an increase in demand for its services.
(1) A.W. Stonier and D.C. Hague, Textbook of Economic
Theory, Longman Green & Co., London, 5th Impression 
1956, page 290.
Another feature in the development of rent theory 
was that earlier notions that payment of rent is simply a 
transfer of an unearned surplus which is not necessary to 
induce the supply of a factor of production (land) have been 
supplemented by the recognition that rent provides motivation 
for the allocation of resources and, in the case of entrepre­
neurial rent, is highly significant as a motivational force for 
the organization of production. (1)
From the point of view of any one agricultural 
producer, the full charge (rent) for hiring land must be paid,
i.e., his earnings must cover it, if he is to remain in 
production. Rent is not an unearned surplus to the individual 
producer. Even if a producer purchased instead of renting land, 
he would still have to pay the equivalent of rent in another 
form, i.e. the cost of interest on the money borrowed to purchase 
the land, or alternatively, if he purchased the land with his own 
money, he would have to forego the interest his money previously 
earned. However to the extent that the value of land increased 
beyond what the producer paid for it, his rental outlays (costs) 
would be less than his rental earnings.
The lower limit on rental payments (or their imputed 
equivalents) is set by the transfer earnings of the land, i.e. the 
earnings of the land in its next most profitable activity, for 
otherwise it would be more profitable to transfer the use of the 
land to this activity. The upper limit on rental payments 
depends on the price of the product being produced on the land 
in question.
From the point of view of the industry, the transfer 
earnings of land are an inescapable cost which must be met if 
the land is to remain in the industry and only the difference 
between the actual hiring charge and these transfer earnings 
is in the nature of rent i.e. 1
(1) J.S. Keiper et. al* Theory and Measurement of Rent: 
Chilton Co., Philadelphia 1961.
solely dependent on the price of the product being produced.
As indicated later, payment of this 'surplus' is not necessary 
to keep resources in the industry but it acts as an allocative 
force attracting additional re-sources into the industry.
From the point of view of the economy as a 
whole, rent is not a cost; it is a differential return, a 
result of price and not a factor determining price; transfer 
earnings are zero.
Ricardo held that land rent was not a factor cost 
but was determined by commodity prices and was simply a 
transfer of an unearned surplus deriving from the use of the 
original and indestructible powers of the soil (on intra­
marginal land). Except insofar as there is a quasi rental 
component of land rent this thesis still has general acceptance 
from the point of view of the economy as a whole.
Land Rent
There can be as many as three distinct elements in 
a payment for the rent of land: a scarcity rent component, a 
differential rent component, and a quasi-rent component.
Scarcity rent designates the payment made for the 
use of a factor in imperfectly elastic supply. Differential 
rent is the payment made in respect of the differential 
fertility of non-homogeneous units of land. These 
distinctions have little real value in practice since, as 
Marshall noted, "In a sense all rents are scarcity rents, 
and all rents are differential rents" (1). Both of these 
rents would qualify for Ricardo's definition of rent as a 
payment for the original and indestructible powers of the 
soil.
The quasi rent component of land rent, however, 1
(1) A. Marshall: Principles of Economics, 8th ED, p.422„
does have a higher order of significance for clearly its 
size will effect farmers' decisions on the matter of 
applications of labour and capital to the land for the 
purpose of effecting further improvements and for 
maintaining the existing improvements to the soil. If 
the value of land were in fact mainly due to past 
applications of labour and capital, then the rental earnings 
in respect of this investment would clearly influence future 
decisions on re-investment and/or new investment in land 
improvements. The truth of the matter is, however, 
shrouded in conjecture.
According to Keiper (l), Professor B.A. Knight
writing in 1933, took the view that the original value of
the soil is not important in relation to rent:
It will be clear, however, that the really 
original and indestructible qualities of the 
soil are limited in number, and their value 
is inseparably bound up with the value of 
qualities which are the result of expenditure 
of labour and capital in the past. More care­
ful investigation will raise doubt as to 
whether the total cost of what is called land 
value is in excess of the total expenditure 
upon natural resources in the past. It is 
largely, if not altogether, fallacious to 
regard land as an unproduced good.
Australian experience lends support to this 
notion. Even at this time when land rents are relatively 
high, the value of our uncleared virgin land (e.g. Brigalow), 
especially if heavily timbered, is small in relation to the 
improved value of the land when it has been established as 
a farm.
Wadham and Wood (2) indicated quite clearly the 1
(1) op. cit., pll2
(2) Wadham & Wood: Land Utilzation in Australia, M.U.P. 1939 ppl6-31.
great and sometimes enormous difficulties associated with 
farming development in Australia. In the wheat industry
special equipment had to be developed for sowing and 
harvesting on low yielding soils, phosphatic deficiencies 
had to be overcome, special machinery was needed to deal 
with rocks and stumps of original vegetation, new crop 
varieties had to be developed to suit the climate. In the 
dairy industry clearing proved an enormous problem and it 
was not until the development of refrigeration machinery, 
the cream separator, the Babcock testing machine and the 
coming of the railways that the industry’s outlook was 
greatly altered. Thus, if we think of the production 
process as ending in the market into which the commodity 
produced is offered for sale, as indeed we are perfectly just­
ified in doing, then it is obvious that labour and capital 
(technology) played an overwhelmingly important part in the 
productive process in early Australian agricultural develop­
ment .
Although land values were very low in the early 
phases of our agricultural development, values subsequently 
rose quite considerably (1).
The question arises whether these increases in 
value (rents) are properly attributable to the original 
powers of the soil. According to the marginal productivity 
theory of distribution, the share of factors in the value 
product will depend on the marginal physical product of each 
factor, the equilibrium position being determined by the law 
of equi-marginal productivity: that is to say, units of one 
factor will be substituted for units of another, until the 
marginal value-unit of any one factor contributes to output 
an amount equal to the marginal revenue product of a value- 
unit of any other factor. 1
(1) Wadham & Wood ibid p.30 footnote 11
The application of this theory is, however, limited 
by our classification of factors of production: we think of 
land as a single factor of production, whereas in point of 
fact we are mainly dealing with highly developed land which 
owes some if not most of its value to past applications of 
labour and capital which can no longer be distinguished from 
the value of the land it self. We are therefore left with 
the conclusion that the rent for the purely original and 
indestructible powers of the soil is an unknown but possibly 
small proportion of total rents paid in respect of highly 
developed land: the remainder, also unknown, of the rental 
paid is a quasi-rent. Some part of. this will relate to 
improvements which are absolutely permanent, e.g. clearing, 
the remainder will relate to depreciable improvements, e. g» 
drainage, the cost of which must be covered in the long term 
if these depreciable improvements are to be maintained.
The existence of a quasi-rent is not, however, a 
necessary condition for the carrying out of such maintenance 
work (assinning that the relevant resources are not earning 
rents in other industries); all that is necessary is that the 
return from these depreciable improvements should cover their 
servicing costs.
But the existence of quasi-rents would be necessary 
to draw further resources into the industry to effect new 
improvements of this nature - that is to say, if the price of 
the product for which the land is being used rises sufficiently 
quasi-rents would appear and new resources would flow into the 
industry and existing land would be further improved.
As the rent which land attracts is due in part 
to its scarce supply the nature and extent of the rise in rents
following an increase in demand for the products of 
farming will depend on the elasticity of supply of land.
This elasticity in turn, depends very much on whether we 
are considering agriculture as a whole or simply one 
industry and whether we are thinking in terms of the 
short or the long term.
If only one industry, e.g. wool, received an 
increased price for its product, or if its price increased 
relative to the price of other agricultural products, the 
elasticity of supply of land in respect of the wool industry 
in terms of physical units of land could be fairly elastic 
in the short term. In the 1950* s wool boom, for example, 
very large numbers of non-wool producers started to run sheep.
If on the other hand there were a general increase
in prices of agricultrual products, the resulting rise in
the demand for land could not be satisfied by switching land
from one use to another. Thus in the short term the supply
of land would be highly inelastic and agricultural land rents
would be high. In the longer term, more intensive farming
practices would lead to an increase in agricultural output„
In advanced countries there is a strong upward trend in the
rate of application of capital to land as the result of(1)technological advancement. As Keiperv points out, in­
creased technology is a powerful factor in increasing the 
the supply of land in terms of agricultural output and in 
this regard, Australian agriculture is typical. In modern 
times this "productivity" factor has been far more important 
in meeting the demand for land than the opening up of virgin 
land so
Capital G-oods
As regards capital goods, Marshall pointed out 
that earnings in the short term when supply is fixed are in 
the nature of rent (he called them quasi rents)(2). This is 1
(1) Keiper, op. cit., pl09
(2) Marshall, op. cit., p412
so because the supply of the factor is only able to 
respond to demand forces in the longer run, increasing 
or decreasing accordingly as the earnings of the factor 
are higher or lower than the rate of interest on floating 
capital. In the short run supply is fixed and the price 
of the factor embodied in the enterprise is determined by 
the demand for its product. This price or earning of 
capital embodied in an enterprise is a quasi rent and is 
defined as the total earnings of a factor less its servic­
ing costs, in the short term.
If the demand for farm capital rises, the resulting 
rise in its price will depend on its elasticity of supply and 
if this were low the demand for capital would also be governed 
by the elasticity of substitution of land for capital (labour 
would not be important in this.regard because in Australia 
substitution of labour - which is in relatively scarce supply - 
for capital on farms is highly unlikely).
In general, the elasticity of supply of capital 
goods depends on the level of merchandising stocks, the 
elasticity of supply of imports and the degree of roundaboutnes 
of production of these goods. In respect of those capital 
goods which are in common use in both the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, the elasticity of supply could be 
expected to be relatively high if the farm sector were 
relatively small in relation to the total economy as in 
Australia. In respect of capital goods which are specialized 
to the.farm, e.g. harvesters, the elasticity of supply could 
be expected to be lower than for other capital goods.
The lower the elasticity of supply of a capital 
good the greater is the tendency for the price to increase
assuming no substitution. However, the supply price of 
complex industrial goods is often not importantly a 
function of short term demand. Rather it: is related to 
costs in the medium to long term. In other words, prices 
of capital goods are often unresponsive to short term 
changes in demand and only tend to change in the short term 
in response to increases in production costs. In these 
circumstances, the rationing influence of price is 
temporarily superseded by physical rationing by suppliers 
usually on the basis of the chronological placement of 
orders; of course, unless demand pressure persisted into 
the longer term, this might only amount to little more than 
longer-than-normal delivery dates.
If, following an increase in prices of farm 
commodities, prices of capital goods do not increase because 
of price policy of manufacturers then capital goods purchased 
in response to this rise in price would, like embodied 
capital goods earn a quasi rent equal to their earning rate 
less their servicing cost,which would accrue to producers.
However, if the prices of capital goods responded 
to the short term pressure of demand then the producer will 
not earn a quasi rent on new acquisitions of capital but only 
in respect of his existing supply of capital,
Labour
The rent earned by labour (or ability) is the 
difference between its actual earnings and its transfer 
earnings. If the actual earnings of labour in a particular 
industry were to fall below its transfer earnings, the supply 
of labour in that industry would fall to zero. Normally the 
rental earnings of labour disappear in the long term. In 
rare instances some persons possess particular skills which 
cannot be duplicated; in these cases, rental earnings would
continue into the long term.
If the demand for labour rises, the resulting rise, 
in price will be the greater, the lower its elasticity of 
supply and the lower the elasticity of substitution of capital 
for labour.
Traditionally Australia has been a labour scarce 
country and our agriculture has never been characterized by 
the existence of significant levels of disguised unemployment 
once so common in European and still very common in Asian 
agricultureo Further in the post—World-War II period the fast 
developing industrial sector in this country has exerted a strong 
pull on labour resources and labour shortages have at times been 
most pronounced. Agriculture has not been isolated from these 
events and accordingly the current farm labour supply may be 
taken to have relatively low elasticity.
When the demand for the product of one farm industry 
increases, wages rates in that industry have to rise to attract 
the further labour units required for the increase in production. 
This increase in wages would tend to spread right through the 
industry. These extra payments are quasi rents - they are not 
necessary to keep existing labour units in the industry but they 
are necessary to induce new labour units to enter the industry.
This is of particular importance to farm proprietors
since the quasi rents must be paid out in the form of higher
wages and thus represent additional real costs to the farming
enterprise. This contrasts with the rental earnings of
capital goods which accrue as additional income to the
enterprise. And in an era of full or high levels of employment,
it is not by any means certain that a rise in labour earningsbe
in one sector will only/temporary. It is more likely that the 
inflow of labour into this sector will create shortages of labour 
in other sectors and thus lead to competitive bidding for labour. 
This would, cet. par., create a tendency for industries unable to 
cost increases in the form of higher prices,to stagnate.pass on
Enteroreneurial Rent
In a competitive industry a firm is in 
equilibrium when marginal revenue, marginal cost and 
average cost are equated. This happens when factor supply 
has been adjusted to factor demand and quasi rents have 
been eliminated. Each factor will then be earning an 
amount equal to its marginal revenue product and there 
will be a residual component of the price which will 
represent the reward for the entrepreneur for his skill.
The entrepreneur performs an essential function which 
can never be eliminated and as it is specialised its 
earnings may be called a rent (1). Actual earnings 
will, of course, be the greater, the more efficiently 
productive factors are combined.
Actual earnings are partly anticipated and 
partly unanticipated. Of the two types only anticipated 
earnings act as a motivating force in the organization of 
production; this may be termed entrepreneurial rent. 
Unanticipated returns are unexpected windfall returns and 
are properly regarded as pure profits. As Keiper points 
out the separation of entrepreneurial rent from profits 
is based conceptually on the distinction between risk 
which in a probability sense can be reduced to a cost and 
uncertainty which cannot be anticipated (2). This conceptual 
distinction is, however, impossible to make in practice. In 
other words, entrepreneurial rent cannot be identified in 
the residual earnings of an enterprise after payments to 
other factors of production have been made.
(1) Keiper, op. cit. p.115
(2) ibid, p.115
From the foregoing discussion the following points 
which will h e of decided interest in our consideration 
of the policy of cost-hased price stabilisation in the 
wheat industry and the assessment of costs for that 
purpose, emerge:
1. Any factor of production may earn a rent
2. Only that part of the rental earnings of a factor 
in excess of its servicing cost (reflecting the 
cost of capital) is not a cost to producers,
3. Rent plays an important part in allocating 
economic resources thus any attempt to limit these 
earnings in one industry would inhibit the economic 
allocation of resources; and would, cet. par., 
encourage the withdrawal of resources from that 
industry.
4. As regards land rent, it is impossible to distinguish 
between unearned rent due to the original powers of 
the soil from quasi rent due to basic improvements to 
land.
5, Quasi rental earnings of labour (excluding farmers' 
own labour) do not accrue to the farm enterprise and 
thus represent a real cost to producers at all times. 
These earnings tend to disappear in the longer term.
6, Quasi rental earnings of embodied capital accrue as 
part of the earnings of farm enterprise and tend to 
disappear in the longer term. They are not a cost 
to producers.
Entrepreneurial rent is the residual (if any) in 
enterprise earnings after paying for all factors and 
reflects the skill differentials of producers in 
combining factors of production together. This item, 
by its very nature is not a cost to any producer.
7.
Reflecting land rents in a cost-based price 
provides the price fixer with a first class dilemma. Normally 
it would be desirable to use market prices because this would 
be consistent with the objective of reasonable incomes for 
producers and, at the same time, it would tend to minimize 
any misailocation of resources resulting from the use of 
guaranteed prices.
However if, say, wool prices and thus land values 
were high and these values were reflected in the guaranteed 
wheat price a misallocation of resources would result and 
wheatgrowers’ incomes would exceed the reasonable levels the 
guaranteed price was intended to provide. In this situation 
the social cost of the welfare objective would be higher than 
necessary.
In such circumstances land values should be assessed 
on a more conservative basis, perhaps at the level indicated 
by longer term trends, and the guaranteed price should act 
as a floor price rather than as an actual return to the 
producer. (This would not r i;o be inconsistent with the 
principle of the wheat stabilization fund). This is already 
the position with regard to exports up to the guaranteed level 
and the principle could be applied to home consumption as 
well.
In the opposite situation of depressed land values, 
the values for costing purposes in terms of the policy 
objective would need to be above such values. However, as 
this would encourage an inflow of resources into the industry 
the policy would, cet. par., bankrupt itself unless production 
controls were also introduced.
(c) Effect of Guaranteed Wheat Prices on Resource Allocation
We shall now consider how land was valued in the wheat stabilization 
schemes and what effects this and the pricing of other cost items appeared 
to have on the allocation of resources through the cost-based guaranteed 
price.
In the first two schemes running from 1943/49 to 1957/58 the valuation 
basis was long-term security value which is approximately 75$ of the 
market value. The land values reflected in the first scheme were those 
ruling in 1947 and in the second scheme those ruling in 1950 - the survey 
in regard to this latter scheme covering the three year period ended 
1949/50.
The broad movements in land values has been summed up by Macphillamy (l). 
These relate to New South Wales but they can be accepted as being indicative
of price trends for Australia as a whole.
"By 1946, pent-up demand for rural lands had become very noticeable 
and marked the end of a long and difficult period for rural producers which
went back as far as 1929. The earlier stages of this period were character­
ised by lpw commodity prices, indifferent seasons and uncertainty, whilst 
in the latter stages, war-time controls, shortages of labour and materials, 
lack of finance and drought had all assisted to keep demand in check.
"1946 saw the end of a long and disastrous drought and with the war 
concluded, demand for land strengthened. Transactions were restricted, 
however, by the operations of Lands Sales Control which had, under National 
Security Regulations, related "consent" prices to those ruling as at the 
10th February, 1942. The Commonwealth handed over these controls to the 
States on September 20th, 1948, who continued them for a further period, 
which in New South Wales was of approximately a year’s duration. (l)
(l) Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, December, 1964.
With the lifting of controls, a land hunger was evidenced by a 
large volume of transactions and steeply increasing prices which did 
not abate until prices had risen spectacularly and prospects had become 
more uncertain.
The actual end of controls was followed very closely by currency 
devaluation in September, 1949; the Korean War broke out in June, 1950; 
as a result the price of primary products continued to rise, partly 
because of stockpiling, culminating in the sensational prices reached 
by wool during 1950 - 51 (£-1 per 1 lb.).
Prices continued to increase for most types of land after 1951 - 52 
but at a steadily decreasing rate until about 1956 - 57 since when they 
have been relatively stable in spite of fluctuations in commodity prices, 
taxation, interest rates and finance available for the purchase of land.”
It will be seen from these comments that land values had not risen 
at all in step with the increase in the overseas demand for foodstuffs 
following the war. Various factors contributed to this but the main two 
were price control on land and both bulk marketings of foodstuffs overseas 
at less than world market prices and price control of foodstuffs on 
produce consumed locally. It is apparent then that land values were 
artificially low at the time the valuations were made for the first scheme.
Table I indicates that by 1948/49 the value of land suitable for 
wheat growing had increased by only 25$ on a pre-war base. By comparison 
the wholesale price index on the same pre-war basis (Table 2) indicated 
a rise in prices of 80$. This index showed that the prices of foodstuffs 
and tobacco had also risen 74$. It is therefore quite clear that land 
values were being effectively controlled and that in real terms values 
were actually lower than in the immediate pre-war period.
Table. /, m
Index of Rural Land Valuest Hew South Wales 
Base 1937-39 = 100
Year Grazing Grazing:-Part- Agri culutur al... Land
Land(a; arable (b) Suitable Wheat,
fodder crops lambs, 
and high 
prod’n sown
1947-8 116 120
pastures
120 120
9 120 125 125 125
1949-50 135 150 160 170
1 190 210 230 240
2 205 250 270 260
3 230 270 300 275
4 260 290 320 285
5 280 300 340 290
6 280 305 345 290
7 270 295 345 270
8 260 295 345 270
9 260 300 350 280
1959-60 270 300 355 285
1 280 300 360 290
2 285 305 365 295
3 290 310 375 300
(a) Merino breeding and wool growing.
fat
etc*
(b) Suitable for sown pastures.
Source: H.G. Macphillamy: Factors affecting Rural 
land Prices in N.S.W. and Construction of 
Tables of Rural Land Values Indices. 
Australian Journal of Ag.£o. Dei, 1964.
Table 2: Wholesale Prices (Basic Materials and Foodstuffs)
(Base : Average of
Index
3 years to June 1939 = 100)
Year Foodstuffs
& tobacco
All Groups Year Foodstuffs
& tobacco
All
(xroup;
1936-7 98 99 1953-54 308 319
-8 102 101 5 315 322
-9 101 100 6 325 334
1945-6 136 142 7 324 344
-7 139 144 8 325 339
-8 154 159 9 332 336
-9 174 180 1959-60 348 348
1949-50 1 96 204 1 372 360
1 229 244 2 332 336
2 276 297 3 342 340
3 293 319 4 352 346
Source: Commonwealth Statistician
Table 3 : Proportion of Wheat Production Exported
Year
Production
m. bus.
Home
Consumotion
Exnort Exnort Surnlus
Surnlus as % of Production
m. bus. m. bus. m. bus.
1947-48 220.1 74.9 145.2 66.0
9 190.7 77.7 113.0 59.3
1949-50 218.2 78.3 139.9 64.1
1 184.2 84.0 100.2 54.4
2 159.7 79.2 80.5 50.4
3 195.2 75.1 120.1 61 .5
198.0 68.4 129.6 65.5
5 168.6 72.4 96.2 57.1
6 195.4 71.4 124.0 63 *5
7 134.5 77.1 57.4 42.7
8 97.6 73-3 24.3 24.9
9 215.1 69.4 145.7 67.7
1959-60 198.5 77-1 121 .4 61 .2
1 273.7 78.5 195.2 71 .3
2 247.2 75.1 172.1 69.6
3 306.9 72.4 234.5 76.4
4(est) 331 .0 75.3 255.7 77.3
Source - Commonwealth Statistician.
The valuation basis in the first scheme must therefore have greatly 
understated the free market value of land for not only would the valuations 
have been artificially low if they had been based on the current controlled 
prices but they understated the market value even further by taking only 
75% of the current value to give long term security value.
As land is a major cost item the effect of this on the cost formula 
would, cet. par,, have been to discourage expansion of wheat production.
In addition to this, the allowance in the cost formula for the owner- 
operator was, as indicated in Part II, grossly inadequate. Combined with 
apparent underpricing of other items in the cost formula, the effects of
these two major cost items must have represented a considerable under­
assessment of real costs.
Fortunately for the wheat grower only that part of his production 
which was consumed locally was disposed of at the assessed cost of produc­
tion figure. The remainder, which was exported, attracted very high prices 
so that the average returns to growers for the whole of their production 
was considerably above the guaranteed price. The importance of exports 
in this regard is indicated in Table 3 where it will be seen that, except 
in drought years, exports have ranged from 100 million bushels upwards as 
compared with annual home consumption of 70 to 80 million bushels.
Nevertheless, the low domestic price for wheat made wheat growing 
relatively unattractive and wheat acreages started to decline. In 1949-50, 
for example, the area sown to wheat was down 1,7 million acres from the
3-947-48 level of 13.9 million acres (Table 4). Notwithstanding that, 
export prices were still very high at 15/10d a bushel in relation to the 
guaranteed price of 7/lid a bushel (Table 5).
From 1950/51 the influence of high wool prices (Table 4) was also 
reflected in the drift from wheat growing but the influence of the home 
consumption price arrangements was also a factor. The dissatisfaction of 
wheatgrowers with the large discrepancy between domestic and export 
returns actually forced the government to amend its guaranteed price 
arrangements. The application of the guaranteed price to domestic pro­
ducers of pigmeats and poultry was discontinued and a much higher price 
set. In addition the government in 1951/52 and 1952/53 paid subsidies
c/c/n&S^'cto growers to raise the level of their* returns to a price of 16/Id a 
bushel, a price approaching f.o.b. export values.
Very clearly the guaranteed home consumption was now without any 
force or application.
With the cessation of price controls on land at the turn of the 
decade, values rose strongly as indicated in Table 1. From a 1948-49 
level 25% above pre-war,land suitable for wheat growing reached a level 
70% above pre-war in 1949-50 and 240% above pre-war in the following year, 
the year of the Korean War boom.
Taking the demand for wheat at the average export price as infinite 
because Australian exports are too small a proportion of total supplies 
in world markets to significantly affect the ruling price, it is evident
Table ft.. m
Wheat Acreage and Production, Wool Prices and Quantum 
of Farm Production : Australia
Year Acreage Production Greasy Quantum
Wool of Farm
Price Production
M.Ac. M. B. d. lb. 1936-39 = 100
1947-8 13-9 220 39.50 109
, “9 12.6 191 48.07 109
1949-50 12.2 218 63.35 115
1 11 .7 184 144.19 109
2 10.4 160 72.42 103
3 1 0.2 195 81.80 121
4 10.8 198 81 .50 122
5 10.7 1 69 70.88 123
6 10.2 195 61.46 131
7
8
7.9 134 79.66 131
8.8 98 62.45 124
9 10.4 215 48.57 149
1959-60 12.2 199 57.7 8 144
1 13-4 274 52.06 152
2 14.7 247 54.13 155
3 16.5 307 58.96 166
4 16.5 328 69.70 173
Source : Wool prices - National Council of Wool Selling
Other data ■- C.B.C.S.
Table 5 : Wheat-Guaranteed Price, Home Consumption Price, 
Average Export Value f.o.b. and Pool Payments 
1948-49 to 1963-64 (per .bushel)
Season Guaranteed Home C. Av. Export Pool Paym
Price Pri ce Value f.o.b. (bulk whe
s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d.
1948-49 6 8 6 8 15 7.0 11 3.4
1949-50 7 1 6 8(a) 15 10.3 13 0.1
1 7 10 7 10 17 2.8 12 7.4
2 10 0 10 0(b) 17 7.0 14 2.9
3 11 11 11 11(13) 17 5-5 14 11 .7
4 12 7 14 1*(c) 14 0.4 12 0.8
5 12 7 14 1*(c) 12 6.5 11 0.8
6 13 1 13 5ir(c) 12 10.6 12 0
7 13 8 13 9i (c) 14 2.7 12 6.1
8 14 2 14 4(d) 13 10.4 12 11.9
9 14 6 14 8(d) 13 2.3 13 2
1959-60 14 10 15 0(d) 13 2.7 13 5.4
1 15 2 15 4(d) 13 4.7 13 7.6
2 15 9 15 10(d) 14 3.5 14 5.3
3 15 10 15 11 i (d) 13 6.8 13 11.3
4 14 5 14 7(d) 14 5 13 9
(a) Growers paid a subsidy of 5d 
price.
a bushel to meet the guaranteed
(b) In 1951-52 subsidy of 4s. 1d. paid; in 1952-53 subsidy of 
2s. 5d. Home consumption price of stockfeed was fixed at 
12s. Od. on 1951-52 and 13s. 11d. in 1952/53•
(c) Includes loading of 1 -g-d. to meet the cost of shipping wheat 
from the mainland to Tasmania.
(d) Includes loading of 2d. to meet the cost of shipping wheat 
from the mainland to Tasmania.
Sources: Commonwealth Statistician and Australian
Wheat Board.
that guaranteed prices reduced the real level of the national product 
because resources were discouraged by the effects of the guaranteed price 
arrangements from entering the wheat industry notwithstanding that the 
marginal revenue productivity of factors in the industry was higher than 
the respective marginal value productivity of these factors generally.
The valuation basis for land in the second stabilization scheme was 
again long term security value and as it related to values ruling in 1950 
it was again to underprice land in relation to its potential earning 
capacity at free market prices. The practice of valuing land once in each 
stabilization scheme and that at a point of time well in advance of the 
first year of the scheme introduces a rigidity in the cost formula which 
may lead to undesirable consequences, if, as in the first scheme, other 
arrangements are not introduced to offset the effects of such rigidities.
If we look at Table 1 again we shall see that the 1950 valuation of 
land in the second scheme was probably not above the level of 150% of pre­
war values - roughly 75% of the mean of the two years 1949-50 and 1950-51* 
By the time the second scheme got under way in 1953-54, however, land 
values had risen to a level 285% of the pre-war level. Again we find an 
important conservative element in costs and thus in the guaranteed price. 
The allowance for the owner-operator on the other hand, though still con­
servative, was much more realistic than in the first scheme. Other cost
items were also underpriced but the overall effect was clouded by the un­
satisfactory division of costs between wheat production and sidelines.
4-S',
The reaction of wheat growers to the guaranteed prices ruling under 
the second stabilization scheme is reflected in the trend in acreages. In 
1953-54, the first year of the scheme, 10.8 million acres were sown to wheat 
but by 1957-58 the acreage was down to 8.8 million acres. This latter 
figure probably exaggerates the drop in acreage because it was a drought 
year but there is no doubt that the downward trend in acreages evident by 
the turn of the decade continued during the second scheme.
Of course, the high average level of wool prices played a part in the 
movement of resources out of wheat growing during the middle 19501s. In 
the first year of the second scheme wheat growers were still being denied 
an export parity price in respect of home consumption but the following year 
with the downward trend in export returns continuing, average export values 
fell to the level of the guaranteed price (Table 5)# Thereafter the 
guaranteed price and thus the home consumption price tended to exceed the 
export returns by a small margin, the deficit in export returns being 
financed out of previous growers* contributions to the wheat stabilization 
fund. By 1956/57 this was possibly reflected in the lower land values, the 
index registering a drop of 1% in the face of a strong wool market in that 
year, although the drought was probably the strongest factor in the movement.
On balance it appears that in the second scheme the guaranteed prices 
which were then fairly close to the level of export returns did not lead to 
misallocation of resources as in the first scheme and thus that in the 
absence of guaranteed prices the level of production would have been much 
the same. But the wheat industry was strongly affected by the higher wool
prices resulting in a considerable movement of resources from wheat to 
wool production.
In the third stabilization scheme land was valued at fair market value.
The Commonwealth Bank defined fair market value as follows:- (l)
“The accepted meaning of market value is the amount which the land 
might be expected to realize on the open market in competition between a 
willing, but not over-anxious, buyer and a willing, but not over-anxious, 
seller. This definition has been supported by the Courts. In some 
Valuation Acts improved value is defined, in effect, as the amount which 
the land might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reason­
able terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require.
“Because of price inconsistencies which are characteristic of the land 
market, particularly since the year 1949/50, prices realised for individual 
properties are often higher or lower than valuers’ and land agents’ 
estimates based on the general level of value disclosed by district sales. 
There exists therefore, an expected range within which the price can be 
expected to fall. The mid-point of this range may be regarded as the fair 
market value and the lower point of the range, the conservative market 
value•
“The term ’conservative’ in relation to the market value of land has 
never been properly defined, but is often regarded by valuers as a figure 
around the bottom of the price range disclosed at the market. The per­
centage difference between conservative and market value and fair market 
value thus depends upon the width of market fluctuations. It is frequently 
some 5$ to 10% below the fair market value. In respect of sample proper­
ties in the 1957 wheat survey the conservative market value, if applied, 
would probably have averaged around 5% below the mid-point of the range.”
At the same time the allowance for the owner-operator was raised to a 
level which, as indicated in Part II was probably,as intended, close to 1
(1) See Wheat Index Committee Report : The Economic Structure of the 
Australian Wheat Industry in Relation to the Guaranteed Return — 
Proposed Wheat Stabilization Scheme, 1958, B.A.E., Canberra.
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income parity vis-a-vis non-farm workers. Further other changes were made 
in the cost assessments which tended to raise costs. On the other hand 
the insertion of a more realistic (but still not in itself an adequate) 
yield figure had the effect of reducing unit costs. The net change in 
the guaranteed price was an increase of 4d a bushel on the previous year’s 
figure of 14/6d.
In the course of the third scheme wool prices decreased considerably 
and wheat growing with guaranteed prices thus became relatively more 
profitable. As a consequence resources moved back into wheat production, (l) 
The extent of the change is reflected in the following figures. Areas 
sown to wheat increased from 10.4 million acres in 1958/59 to 16.5 million 
acres in 1962/63. Over the same period production rose from 215 million 
bushels to 323 million bushels, a rise of 50%.
For the whole of the third scheme the guaranteed price which was in­
creased each year by the assessed movement in cost of production exceeded 
average export realizations which, reflecting consistent selling policies 
of the U.S.A. and Canada who isolated their surplus production from com­
mercial markets and the moderate stabilizing influence of the International 
Wheat Agreement, remained remarkably stable.
The Wheat Price Stabilization Fund was used to bring producers’ average 
returns in respect of 100 million bushels of exports up to the guaranteed 
price but in 1959-60 the Fund was exhausted and the guarantee was maintained 
by direct Commonwealth subsidy. Over the course of the third scheme sub­
sidies totalling 130.5 million were made to bring producers’ returns up to
(l) L. W. McLennan : Recent Wheat Average Changes : Quarterly Review of
Agricultrual Economics 1963.
guaranteed levels.
In this situation the marginal revenue productivity of resources in 
the industry fell below their marginal value productivity and marginal 
revenue productivity in other industries and a misallocation of resources 
resulted. However, since the lower marginal revenue productivity was not 
reflected in lower earnings to factors because of the subsidy, no 
incentive to leave the industry existed.
After a further farm survey in connection with the fourth (and current) 
stabilization scheme the guaranteed price for 1963-64 was reduced by l/5d 
a bushel to 14/5d a bushel. This reflects, inter alia, the rise in 
average yields in the wheat industry. It also indicates that the rigidified 
practice of using one yield figure over the course of a stabilization scheme 
when a known trend in yields exists is unrealistic. As indicated in the 
appropriate section of Part II there is no reason for not incorporating a 
trend yield figure into cost assessments on a year-by-year basis.
The wheat stabilization scheme is far from being an open-ended scheme 
guaranteeing prices of everything produced. The price guarantees are limited 
to domestic demand plus a defined quantity of exports (for which there 
traditionally has been a market) and any tendency for production to be en­
couraged by the "illusion" of the guaranteed price results in a watering down 
of average returns to producers. Furthermore, in that each scheme is only 
of five years' duration after which a review is made and a new scheme devised, 
it might be argued with some force that the scheme has "built-in" safeguards 
to minimize the misallocation of resources that could otherwise result.
We may finally consider the effect of guaranteed 
wheat prices on industries which use wheat as an input or 
which compete with wheat as a feed grain.
The major rural industries using wheat as a major 
input are the pig and poultry industries. In the early years 
of stabilization these industries paid only the home 
consumption price for the wheat they used but after a time 
wheatgrowers became dis-satisfied with this state of affairs 
and in 1951-52 and 1952-53 the price of wheat to these users 
was lifted to a level closer to export parity. A year later 
a decision was taken to make these users pay the export parity 
price for their wheat. When this occurred the pig and poultry 
industries lost their competitive advantage over overseas 
producers and the export sector, partly for this reason, 
stagnated.
Commodities which compete with wheat as a feed 
grain are barley and oats in the cereal group and maize and 
sorghum as other grains. Because these grains have close price 
relationships with each other it follows that if the price of 
wheat is fixed arbitrarily the effect of this will be reflected 
in feed grain prices generally and thus in the allocation of 
resources in respect of their production. Furthermore as the 
influence of these feed grain prices, which will generally be 
higher or lower than would obtain if wheat prices were market 
determined, is exerted the allocation of resources in all 
livestock industries using feed grains is affected. Thus when 
wheat prices were relatively low in the earlier years of 
stabilization,production in the user industries could be regarded 
as having been carried to a higher level than otherwise. In 
effect the production of these user industries was being 
subsidised.
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In the situation which has prevailed in recent 
years, where domestic prices have tended to exceed export 
parity, the price of feed grains would have tended to 
inhibit the level of production of those livestock industries 
using feed grains as an important input.
Income Distribution
Normally income is distributed through the shares of 
factors in the price of the products they produce. The 
equilibrium position occurs when the marginal value productivity 
of a value-unit of one factor is equal to the marginal revenue 
productivity of a value-unit of each other factor.
However when prices are fixed arbitrarily above or below 
the market price of a product a redistribution of income will 
take place. In the case where the price is fixed above the 
market price the transfer of income may be from the taxpayer to 
the producer and/or from the consumer to the producer. Under 
wheat price stabilization both of these means of redistributing 
income are used, the former in relation to certain quantities of 
wheat exported and the latter in relation to domestic consumption 
in Australia.
The apparent re-distribution of income resulting from 
stabilized wheat prices is shown in Table 6 which was calculated 
on the basis of multiplying the volume of home consumption by 
the difference (+ or -) between the home consumption and average 
export price and adding to this any direct subsidy on exports. 
This indicates that over the course of the first three 
stabilization schemes there has been a net transfer of income 
from wheatgrowers to consumers with a considerable balance of 
advantage in favour of consumers. Moreover if we took the 
present value of the income redistributed each year we would 
clearly get an even greater balance in favour of consumers.
The general order of the import parity price has been 
indicated in the last column of Table 6. If the consumer were 
charged this price for wheat which the low elasticity of demand 
would make possible for a monopoly seller, growers would earn 
greater profits and new resources would flow into the industry. 
But as the marginal revenue productivity of these resources would
Table.6 Wheat : "Subsidy" Element In Guaranteed Price
Year Home Excess Subsidy Export Total Excess of
Consumption of H.C. 
Price 
over AV. 
Export 
Price
Per Bush.
Element 
in H.C. 
Price
Subsidy
Paid
Subsidy Notional
Import Parity 
Price over H.C. 
Price
Mill. Bush s .d. jjj £M £M s.d.(a)
1947-48 62.4 -11-6 -35.9 -35.9 15- 6
1948-49 65.5 - 8-11 -29.2 - -29.2 12-11
1949-50 66.7 -9-2 -30.6 - -30.6 13- 2
1950-51 73.5 -9-5 -34.6 - -34.6 13- 5
1951-52 68.9 -7-7 -26.1 - -26.1 11- 7
1952-53 64.3 -5-7 -18.0 - -18.0 9- 7
1953-54 57.5 1 .2 - .2 3-11
1954-55 62.3 1- 7 4.9 - 4.9 2- 5
1955-56 63.5 7 1 v9 - 1 *1 3- 1
1956-57 68.0 5 - 1 .4 - - 1 .4 4- 5
1957-56 62.2 6 1 .6 - 1 .6 3- 6
1958-59 57.4 1- 6 4.3 - 4.3 2- 6
1959-60 65*4 1- 9 5-7 3.0 8.7 2- 3
1960-61 64.7 1 -11 6.2 8.9 1 5.1 2- 1
1961-62 59.7 1-6 4.5 7.3 11 .8 1-6
1962-63 56.8 2- 5 6.9 11.3 18.2 1- 7
1963-64 59.7 2 5 0.1 . 6 3-10
Total--139.1 30.6 -108.5
(a) Import parity price based on U.K. equivalent of Australian
f.o.b. price less "Atlantic" freight plus "Pacific" freight.
Source: Derived from statistics published by Commonwealth
Statistician and Australian Wheat Board.
not be greater than in other industries (since the wheat export price 
may be taken as fixed) no increase in the national product would occur.
When the home consumption price of wheat is fixed below its market 
price - a position which prevailed for many years - there will be fewer 
resources engaged in the industry than under market prices. But 
since their marginal revenue productivity would be greater in the wheat 
industry under free market prices than in other industry more would be 
added to the national product by the production of more wheat than would 
be foregone by the loss of production in the other industries. Thus the 
community as a whole suffers a lower level of income in these circum­
stances.
It is clear therefore that guaranteed prices as a means for redis­
tributing income to ensure reasonable incomes for producers, are inapprop­
riate and wasteful. Such prices are even less effective in redistributing 
income within an industry for as Karl Brandt (l) has noted they pro-rate 
the transferred income according to the scale of operation. (l)
(l) Karl Brandt : Guidelines for Revision of Policy : Journal of Fann
Ec. Vol. 43, 1961
Price and Income Stabilization
If the collapse of wheat prices in the 1930's left 
an indelible mark on the minds of our wheat producers and 
legislators, its effects were no less important in the evolution 
of agricultural policies generally.
In this regard the Royal Commission on the Wheat, Flour 
& Bread Industries indicated that the principle of protecting 
the home producer of primary products had been adopted as a 
cardinal point of policy of many countries.
It was evident that the disruptive effects on farmers 
of widely fluctuating world market prices for farm products 
were becoming socially unacceptable in many countries. This 
trend in official thinking has not since changed. Indeed, in 
the post World War II era, non-tariff policies for protecting 
domestic agriculture sectors have actually been extended and 
refined notwithstanding continuous pressure from traditional 
primary-producer-exporting countries, in bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations, to curtail such policies.
The principle of income stabilization of farmers at 
reasonable levels is now a basic tenet of agricultural policy 
of most nations. It has been further defined to mean income parity 
as between farm and non-farm workers.
This principle of income parity, inter alia, was in 
fact a negotiable issue at a number of conferences of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization and ultimately resulted in the 
formulation of an agreement to a set of principles for price 
stabilization and support policies. These principles recognize 
that income parity between farm and non-farm groups is a legitimate 
objective of national farm policies.(2) 1
(1) 5th Report
(2) F.A.O.: National Agricultural Price Stabilization and 
Support Policies - guiding principles recommended by 
F.A.O., Rome, 1961.
As explained in Part II with reference to the owner- 
operator * s allowance, in the third wheat stabilization scheme, 
the principle of income parity as between wheat growers and non- 
iarm workers, implemented through stabilization of the price of 
wheat, was, in effect, endorsed as policy. Of course to the 
extent that this guarantee was limited to a defined volume of 
production, there was no guarantee that income parity would be 
maintained if production increased.
In its purest form, price stabilization may be 
conceived to be a self balancing mechanism through which some 
part of the income earned or which could be earned in years of 
good prices and good incomes is transferred to years of otherwise 
low prices and low incomes by fixation of producer prices at 
their expected mean or trend level. The basic justification is 
that it eliminates socially undesirable price fluctuations 
without affecting price trends.
In terms of the objective of reasonable producer incomes 
this form of price stabilization is appropriate in respect of 
commodities whose prices have neither an upward nor downward 
trend but are subject to considerable fluctuations around a mean 
price level which is in itself satisfactory. This is because a 
price determined on the basis of the (satisfactory) mean level 
of prices would ensure reasonable average incomes over a period. 
But if past experience were to indicate either an upward or 
downwards trend in prices and if this trend were expected to 
continue in the future, then the pure form of price stabilization 
would not ensure reasonable farm incomes, since if prices had a 
downward trend then, ceteris paribus, the stabilization price 
would return producers less than reasonable incomes and vice versa 
In this situation the logical way of stabilizing prices would be 
on the basis of trend, not average, prices. In this connection we
might ask ourselves :
What are the future prospects for basic
foodstuffs?
The history of world agricultural production is one of 
continuing growth featured by periods in which the demand curve 
for agricultural products has moved to the right more rapidly 
than the supply curve and the trend in prices has been upwards, 
and periods when the supply curve has moved to the right more 
rapidly than the demand curve and prices have exhibited a downward 
trend.
On present indications the future position is not 
encouraging from the producer's point of view as factors 
affecting the demand for agricultural products, one the one hand, 
and the supply of agricultural products^ on the other, are 
expected to cause the supply curve to move to the right faster 
than the demand curve and thus widen the gap between total 
production and commercial market opportunities.
The level of demand for a commodity will ultimately 
depend on the size and structure of the population, the level 
of per caput incomes, the tastes and preferences of consumers, 
and the nature of the reaction of consumers to price changes 
(price elasticity of demand) including the willingness with which 
consumers will substitute one commodity for another (the 
elasticity of substitution) following a relative movement in 
their prices. In the short term changes in demand are not usually 
much affected by population and consumer tastes, for the reason 
that these do not tend to change significantly in the short run. 
Wars, booms and depressions have marked effects on demand but 
these are short term factors and only trends in population, per 
caput incomes and consumer tastes remain as the main factors 
in the state of demand in the long term.
For agricultural foodstuffs the income elasticity of 
demand is low (except in low income countries) and it is becoming 
more and more important as a factor limiting the growth of 
markets for basic agricultural commodities•
The price elasticity of demand for basic food is also 
extremely low so that much the same quantity is demanded 
whatever the price. As a result, any shortfall in supply below
■5$.
the level of demand tends to cause a sharp rise in price and any 
surplus of supply a sharp drop in price.
On the supply side new agricultural technology has 
provided and is continuing to provide a springboard for dramatic 
increases in production. Farm mechanisation, land use improvement, 
soil conservation, fertilizers, new crops and breeding have all 
combined to increase the supply of agricultural products faster 
than the expansion of the demand for these products.
In this situation that aspect of agricultural supply 
viz., its low propensity to contract when prices fall or markets 
shrink, makes market equilibrium an elusive goal. The resulting 
tendency is for a secular decline in agricultural prices.
The agricultural producer is therefore faced with the 
prospect of widely fluctuating prices in the short term and an 
increasingly marked tendency for a persistent decline in prices 
over the long term. His position is further complicated by an 
opposite movement in the prices of industrial goods and thus by 
a relatively more marked decline in the "terms of trade" of 
agricultural products for industrial products (1). Moreover, 
agricultural producers who depend on export markets for the 
disposal of a significant proportion of their production have 
had their positions further undermined by the now highly 
protective national agricultural policies of leading industrial 
countries (2,).
The policy of price stabilization and income parity 
for wheat growers as presently conceived would thus appear to be 
facing greater problems in the future than were experienced in 
the recent past because of the tendency for a secular decline in 
wheat prices unless this is corrected by structural adjustment 
between world wheat producers, which is hardly a possibility, or 
continuation of present selling policies o± -Canada end u.o.A. 
who together keep the price of wheat from collapsing by withholding 
surpluses from the market. 1
(1) u.N. Commission on International Commodity trade /m.
P.7, et seq.
(-2) ibid., p is.
Table 7 shows the gross value of wheat production in 
Australia from 19*+9-50 to 1962-63. It will be evident from this 
that there have been considerable fluctuations in year-to-year 
gross earnings. In view of the fact that the general price 
level and the production of wheat both increased during this 
period (Table 2), we might have expected as a sign of the success 
of the policy of providing reasonable income to producers a 
more definite upward movement in gross values. That this did 
not occur indicates that the objective of reasonable incomes 
for producers has not been guaranteed by price stabilization, 
as such, on a year-to-year basis. This reasoning presupposes 
no radical changes in the number of farmers growing wheat, which 
is considered if reasonable since statistics of wheat - farm 
numbers indicate considerable stability. There would, of course, 
be serious administrative difficulties in attempting a direct 
transfer of income to producers if their incomes were low and the 
existence of such a policy would also remove incentives to 
improve they productivity. But incomes could be stabilized 
much more satisfactorily if the cost on which the guaranteed 
price is based, were assessed on the basis of actual yields each 
season. As indicated in Part II in the section on yields, there 
are no insuperable problems in this regard.
The attitude of wheat growers to the price stabilization 
scheme is reflected by the fact that whereas agreement of the 
majority of producers to such schemes is normally obtained by 
referendum before a scheme is implemented, wheat growers’ 
representatives have been able to indicate in respect of the 
third and fourth schemes that growers are so solidly behind 
stabilization that further referenda were unnecessary. It is 
therefore evident that the grower is well satisfied with the 
average level of income over a number of years under wheat 
stabilization even if actual yields cause considerable variations 
from year to year.
A wheat price stabilization fund is set up under 
each scheme as the instrument of policy in maintaining 
guaranteed prices in respect of the volume of exports covered 
by the price guarantee. It is not concerned with home 
consumption prices. The Table below indicates fund credits 
and balances during the first three stabilization schemes.
Funds for the scheme are provided by growers by means 
of a tax on exports when export prices are above the guaranteed 
price up to a maximum of ls.6d a bushel. These funds attract
interest. At the present time the limit on contributions to 
the fund is £30 million.
Both these limitations while notionally inconsistent 
with the principle of stabilization do have the virtue of 
reducing any misallocation of resources resulting from guaranteed 
prices.
In the first scheme no withdrawals were made from 
the fund for stabilization purposes but to prevent the build 
up of excessive amounts in the fund refunds were made to growers 
on a first-in-first-out basis.
In the second scheme a limit of £20 million was 
placed on contributions to the fund but this limit was never 
reached as export prices dropped below guaranteed prices and 
payments out of the fund were necessary.
In the third scheme the fund was again called on to 
make up the shortfall on export returns and the balance of 
growers contributions in the fund become exhausted. In terms 
of the stabilization arrangements the Commonwealth then provided
the funds required to meet the guaranteed price on exports. 
However there is no provision for the Commonwealth subsidy 
to be recovered if growers contributions to the fund commence 
again. The fund is not therefore self-balancing. It is 
evident however that during the second and third schemes the 
fund did provide an element of stabilization by transferring 
producers earnings from years of good prices to years of lower 
prices. However the fund was not large enough to be able to 
meet recurring deficits in export proceeds without direct 
subsidy assistance.
The outlook for wheat prices is such that the fund 
is unlikely to accumulate sufficient reserves from growers* 
contributions to be able to play a significant role in price 
stabilization as a self-balancing mechanism in the future.
TABLE 7: Wheat Prices Stabilization Fund
Year Cred/t to Fund Balance at 30th June
£m £m
1948-9 18.3 18.2
1949-50 13.0 31.2
1 14.0 28.2
2 12.7 27.9
3 8.3 20.6
4 0.3 Nil
5 5#1 5.1
6 4.5 9.6
7 0.3 9.8
8 0.8 9.4
9 1.6* 10.5
1959-60 0.5* 11.0
1 0.5* 5.0
2 12.0* Nil
3 7.3* Nil
* includes Gonnnonwealth subsidy 
Source : Australian Wheat Board#
Costs as a Basis for Price
In this section we shall consider, in turn, the 
influence of cost in the determination of market price, the 
notion of cost in relation to price fixing and the problems 
of cost assessment.
In long term equilibrium, price is equated with cost of 
production - the cost of the resources required to produce 
market demand. In the short term however the controlling factor 
in the determination of basic commodities is the volume of 
marnet supply and the state of demand and except that this level 
of supply is influenced by cost, an influence which is often 
remote and indirect, cost is not a factor in the short run 
movements affecting such products. The commodities will sell for 
what the buyers will pay, irrespective of their cost to the 
producer.
Short period equilibrium occurs when marginal cost is 
equal to price without necessarily being equal to average cost. 
This equilibrium position is achieved when a producer in response 
to say a change in price of his product adjusts his output 
with his existing supply of fixed resources until his marginal 
cost is equal to his marginal revenue.
As the length of the period increases, the influence 
of costs on prices and of prices on costs increases until 
marginal cost, average cost and price are equated in long period 
equilibrium. But not at any stage in this movement into 
equilibrium do costs decide prices or vice versa. Therefore 
long term equilibrium cost would not, except by accident, be the 
same as the short term cost. This means that the latter figure 
which is the sort of figure farm cost surveys purport to 
establish is not, economically speaking, an acceptable guide to 
the long term equilibrium price - the only price that will ensure 
equilibrium of supply and demand.
A cost-based price cannot therefore be reconciled with 
orice formation under marnet conditions and, as we have seen,
the objective of such prices are only achieved at a social cost 
to the community.
tsThe next matter to considerAthe notion of cost in
(-| )relation to pricing. In this regard Greer has pointed out
that "cost finding for pricing purposes is necessarily the
assemblage of a variety of costs facts which can be combined in a
variety of ways to produce a variety of answers". It follows
that if prices are set according to a cost formula which is not
consistent with producers' ideas of costs the objective of
achieving reasonable producer incomes is unlikely to be realized
since the effects may either go too far or not far enough(2)according to the circumstances. Candler has demonstrated 
that to the extent that a cost-based price incorporated a higher 
rate of return on capital and a higher allowance for farmers' own 
labour and management than farmers were prepared to farm for, the 
price of land would rise. This would in turn lead to a higher 
assessed cost and therefore a higher guaranteed price, the effects 
snowballing upwards with each revaluation of land.
In view of the fact that it is a practical impossibility 
to value land more than once in respect of each stabilization 
scheme there is no real opportunity for costs to escalate in the 
manner just discussed over the course of any one stabilization 
scheme. In any event the wheat stabilization scheme is 
quantitatively controlled and the price guarantee is only 
available in respect of home consumption and 1 50 (or before the
fourth scheme 100) million bushels of wheat exported. Thus any 
tendency for resources to move into the industry would have the 
effect of reducing the average returns to wheat growers generally 
thus dampening down the expansion forces.
The other side of the picture is that the price fixer 
might also under-price factors in his cost formula in terms of 
oroducers; ideas of costs. When this happens, as it appears to have 
done in the first scheme, resources will flow out of industry. 1
(1) H.C. Greer : Cost factors in Price Making p. 33•
(2) Wilfred Candler : Statement made to Dairy Industry Parliamentary 
Committee of Enquiry, November, 1959*
We turn now to consider the question of assessing a 
cost of production figure for an industry. Part II has been 
devoted to an appraisal of official cost assessments and the 
problems involved. Here discussion will be directed to two 
particular problems faced by the cost assessor; these are the 
problems of common costs on mixed farms and the widely variable 
unit cost performance of farms as indicated by survey data.
As to the first, the details examination of the so-called 
"sideline deduction method" made in Part II shows conclusively 
that this method is both conceptually and mathematically wrong 
and cannot be accepted as a basis for indicating the current 
cost position of wheat growers. The sideline deduction method 
proceeds from the assumption that sideline income (which is known) 
is normally equal to sideline cost (which is not known). An 
assessment is then made as to the extent that sideline income is 
above or below normal. This decided, a sideline cost figure can 
be calculated. In this way of the total costs of mixed wheat 
farms were actually assumed away in the cost assessment based on 
the 1958 farm survey for the third scheme. It has been suggested 
in Part II that a possible answer to the problem of identifying 
costs on mixed farms is the standard cost method.
Throughout Australia's wheat growing areas the technical 
characteristics of wheat production as such, are basically similar. 
In part this is brought about by the complementarity of basic 
resources - land, labour and plant - and by the indivisibility 
of such resources as the labour of the farmer and plant and machinery
As a consequence of this it appears that an acceptable 
indication of wheat costs of production could be given by 
standard cost methods. Allowance could be made where 
necessary for regional variability in producer's production 
functions by establishing a standard cost formula for each 
region having its own special characteristics. The regional 
cost figures could in due course by "weighted" into a 
national figure.
Standard cost formula could also be adapted to handle 
other farm activities, typically woolgrowing, by the addition 
of appropriate technical data.
As indicated in Part II AfLennan has experimented with 
standard costs for wheat. Unfortunately these results are based 
on assumptions that make it impossible to compare them with 
official cost figures.
As to the matter of the variability of cost 
experiences, as indicated by farm survey unit cost data, the 
main problem appears to be a failure to distinguish between 
actual unit costs of production and planned unit costs.
As stated earlier long period equilibrium occurs when 
marginal cost, average cost and price are equal but it needs to 
be understood that this occurs when expected marginal cost, 
expected average cost and price are equated. This is because 
actual cost diverge from expected costs due to uncontrollable 
deviations of actual from planned output resulting chiefly from 
climatic variability.
Consider, for example, a producer who has made all 
necessary changes in his organization of production in response 
to all long term factors of supply (e.g. new technology) and 
price (e.g. trend) so that his expected marginal cost, expected 
average cost and expected price "X" are equated. While these 
expectations^1 ^ of our producer continue to obtain clearly he will 
not make any more changes in his organization of production 
(since any such changes could only worsen his expectations) 
notwithstanding that his actual costs are sometimes greater than, 
sometimes less than, but never equal to his expected cost. In 
other words, the equilibrium (and critical) relations nip is ihat 
qP exoected unit cost to price not actual unit cost to price•
And the same relationship holds, mutatis mutandis, in respect of 
short period equilibrium. If, in the light of this, we assume, 
as seems most reasonable, that farmers' actual production outlays 
are based on expected yields, then, apart from harvesting costs
(1) For sake of simplicity, it has been assumed that expected
price "X" applies in each of several seasons in the long term.
which vary directly with yield we should relate producers' 
actual costs to their expected yields if we wish to obtain an 
approximation to their real unit cost position.
Comparison of Wheat Price Stabilization Policy with U.S. Price
Support Poli cy
To conclude our appraisal of guaranteed wheat prices a brief com­
parison will now be made with U.S. price support policy.
Under U.S. price support arrangements, prices are calculated which 
aim to maintain the purchasing power of producers in terms of some 
satisfactory past period, i.e., to maintain their real income position. 
Such prices are called parity prices and are derived from what is called 
the parity index - a base-weighted aggregative index of prices paid by 
farmers for goods and services used in production and family living in 
the base period. The price of an individual commodity is determined as 
that price which will maintain a certain (parity) ratio between the price 
index of the commodity and the parity index. The ratio is customarL ly 
fixed within narrow limits.
The formula was defined in the Agriculture Adjustment Act 1933 and 
sought to establish prices which were equivalent in purchasing power to 
prices ruling in the 1909-14 period, (l) The formula has been modified 
over the years and the weight-base period of the parity index has been 
brought forward: however, in its main aspects it is still virtually 
unchanged.
The effect of the U.S. system of price supports has been serious over­
production and the accumulation of enormous surpluses thus causing a 
marked degree of disequilibrium in the markets of the commodities — the 
main one of which is wheat - concerned. In an attempt to combat this ex- 
(l) See, for example, G. S. Shepherd, op. cit., p.2S0, et. seq.
plosion in production under favourable support prices, the U.S. intro­
duced a system of acreage allotments and land retirements under which 
producers were compensated for land taken out of production, however, 
under this system producers retired their poorer land and increased the 
productivity of the land retained in production, (l) As a. result surplus 
production has continued.
The main criticisms that may be directed against the U.S. price 
support policy are that the price supports have been set too high giving 
a powerful stimulus to over-production; that resources are thereby mis- 
allocated; that acreage controls have been ineffective; that price 
guarantees for a few products affect the relations between the prices of 
all farm products and thus affect supply responses of the entire agricul­
tural sector; that excess stocks exert a depressing influence on markets 
even though they are sealed off; that the cost to the Treasury is too 
high and finally that, as a means of redistributing income, they are in­
appropriate (since the income is pro-rated by the scale of operations) 
and wasteful. (2)
Conceptually, the U.S. system may also be criticised for a number 
of other reasons:
. the objective of the system was that it would restore and maintain the 
real income position of farmers but parity prices do not adequately reflect 
changes in producers' real incomes.
(1) Karl Brandt: op.cit., indicated that the key reason for the boosted 
yields was the high excess of marginal revenue over marginal cost in 
the application of more fertilizer and water to crops and pastures.
(2) See, for example, G. E. Brandow: Reflections on Farm Policy, Past 
and Future, Journal of Farm Economics, Part I, 1958, p.177 et. seq. 
and Karl Brandt op. cit.
; <6? .
• the prices paid index relates to all farms and is not therefore 
representative of any one industry nor appropriate in respect of any 
one commodity: thus, the maintenance of any particular percentage 
relationship (parity ratio) between the price of a commodity and the 
prices paid index by a price support system (commodity loan rates) does 
not ensure the desired objective of maintaining producers * purchasing 
power in terms of some earlier period.
. the base year of the parity index should be representative of the 
kind of agriculture likely to be experienced in the years ahead but
practical limitations involved in revising parity index weights almost 
inevitably mean that the weights in use at any particular time are out 
of date.
. parity prices measure only the price of input items in the base 
period, and thus do not take quantity changes which have occurred since 
then into account: this means that parity prices do not take into 
account the important changes in input/output relationships which 
occur over time.
It will be apparent from the above and our discussion of guaranteed 
prices for wheat that both systems are defective in terms of resource 
allocation, income distribution and effects on other industries. How­
ever, guaranteed wheat prices have not (yet) led to the production of 
unmarketable surpluses. This may be mainly attributed to the following: 
. guaranteed prices in the past have not been fixed high in relation to
market prices (they have mostly been lower).
. wool prices have been relatively more attractive than wheat prices.
, the fortuitous emergence of wheat markets in Mainland China and Russia.
If, in the future, guaranteed wheat prices turn out to be relatively 
high, i.e. above the free market price of wheat, and high relative to 
wool prices, the prospect of surplus production will, depending on 
market outlets in Mainland China and Russia, be very strong. In this 
regard the wheat scheme has a '’built-in'* device to discourage over­
production in that the guaranteed price is related to a defined quantity 
of production. However, this would not, in the first instance, deter 
any incentive an individual producer might have to expand because through 
the pool system of averaging returns his increment of revenue from an 
additional unit of production would be greater than the price of the 
product in the free market. The device does, on the other hand, limit 
the potential cost to the Treasury of guaranteed prices and ultimately, 
through it, expansion of production would be checked as the fall in 
average returns became significant.
The Australian policy would seem to have advantages in that each 
scheme is of only five years’ duration and could .before renewal.be 
radically changed if circumstances warranted this. In addition, costs 
may be flexibly defined.
As regards the broad objectives of the policies viz., reasonable 
producer incomes, parity prices, in failing to take "other1' income
earned by producers into account, does not give a sufficient indication 
of producers* true income position. The wheat cost formula, on the 
other hand, could be regarded as notionally reflecting other farm 
activities, e.g. the owner-operator's allowance is related to the total 
farm enterprise.
Turning now to conceptual aspects of the respective price formulae 
it might be said that each has its own grave shortcomings: parity prices 
have the above-mentioned ones as well as those inherent in price indices; 
unit cost figures, on the other hand, cannot be regarded as being reliable 
because no satisfactory method of handling the problem of common costs 
on mixed farms has yet been developed and there is also the problem of 
definition of costs.
Thus, to achieve a common social objective of reasonable incomes 
(income parity) the two systems of price stabilization employ quite 
different devices neither of which can be regarded as being either con­
ceptually or operationally satisfactory.
With regard to the broad aspects of the two systems we have estab­
lished above that both involve social costs and that it is a matter of 
political judgment (or expediency) whether, in pursuit of the objective 
of reasonable producer incomes, these costs are justified.
Criteria commonly used in such judgments include the importance of 
agriculture in the economy, its contribution to export income earnings 
and the maintenance of stable prices for domestic consumers. We may
£ l et.
conclude this section with a brief reference to each of these.
As to the relative importance of agriculture Whetham (l) has indica­
ted that in the U.S. and Australia these sectors are small. Dunsdorf (2) 
has calculated that the contribution of the "wheat industry to national 
income was 5*64% in 1947-48 (reflecting a big harvest and high prices) 
but in view of the subsequent relative drop in wheat prices and the high 
growth rate in the industrial sector, the proportion must be very con­
siderably lower now. Indeed, as Whetham points out, it is the relative 
smallness of agriculture that makes costly support systems possible.
As to agriculture's contribution to export income earnings it would 
be singularly inappropriate if there were a fundamental balance of pay­
ments problem, to single out one or a few particular industries for 
financial support because, in such circumstances, a general restructuring 
of domestic and external price relationships would be warranted.
Finally, as to consumer interests, Brandow (3) has suggested that 
the strong propensity for output to expand under support prices has pro­
vided ample protection for U.S, consumers. In Australia, as we have seen, 
the consumer has faired well under wheat price stabilization. 1
(1) E. H. Whetham, op. cit. p.U+2.
(2) Edgar Dunsdorf, op. cit. p.465.
(3) G. E. Brandow, op. cit. p.177 et.seq.
PART II
APPRAISAL OF COST CONCEPTS AND 
METHODOLOGY IN THE ASSESSMENT OP THE
COST OF WHEAT PRODUCTION IN AUSTRALIA
The Farm Survey
The process of assessment of the base cost for a 
wheat stabilization scheme is initiated by the collection 
of data from a representative sample of farmers by field 
survey.
The survey is preceded by a statistical study of the 
population to determine the size of sample required for a 
given order of accuracy in both the regional and national 
results.
The 1957/58 survey related to farms growing more 
than 100 acres of wheat in the year 1955/56, a year chosen 
because it was not affected by drought or flood and for 
which special statistical tabulations were available. By 
excluding growers producing less than 100 acres of wheat the 
sample was restricted to 63.4$ of the total number of holdings 
growing wheat although these accounted for 92.7$ of the total 
acreage under wheat in that year. However that this did not 
lead to non-representativeness of the sample, was indicated 
by a check of the sample for representativeness against 
population data on the distribution of wheat farms by States, 
by farm size and by area under wheat. These checks indicated 
that the sample conformed reasonably well to the population 
overall and closely in respect of the distribution of the 
sample on the basis of wheat acreage; in the latter case 
the difference being no greater than could be reasonably 
expected to arise from sampling errors. It may therefore be 
concluded that the survey sample was representative of the 
population. This is perhaps a little surprising in view of 
the relatively large number of farms, 571, which had to be re­
jected in the process of selecting the sample target of 400,
stratified by States, since it implies that no significant bias 
was introduced into the sample as a result of rejections or, 
put another way, the rejected farms did not constitute a 
cost class not reflected by farms included in the survey.
It is evident from this that careful attention 
is paid to sample representativeness by the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics in its surveys. However the lack 
of comprehensiveness and accuracy of farmer's records 
necessarily has some effect on the accuracy of survey results 
since the exclusion of all such farms would otherwise mean 
a very high rate of rejections from the sample which would 
in turn be likely to introduce a significant amount of bias.
On the other hand it can be argued with considerable force, 
that the major costs items are not dependent for their accuracy 
on farm records.
When survey data have been collected theja together 
with imputed cost elements are processed (including "indexing 
forward" to the first year of a proposed stabilization scheme) 
into a weighted average cost figure for the industry as a 
whole.Subject to its review by a Committee consisting 
of the Director of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the 
Secretary of the Australian Wheat Growers' Federation and a 
representative of the Australian Agricultural Council and 
with the approval of the Minister in consultation with State 
Ministers this cost becomes the guaranteed price for the 
industry for the first year of a stabilization scheme. For the 
duration of the scheme this base cost is adjusted forward? 
each year by means of a weighted price index of the Laspeyre's
^'This processing technique is demonstrated in Appendix II
in respect of the third wheat industry stabilization scheme.
type. The resulting figures, after examination by the Wheat 
Cost Index Committee and with the approval of the Ministers, 
become the guaranteed prices in their respective years.
Data Processing Procedure
The basic steps involved in transforming farm 
survey data into a unit cost of production figure may be 
illustrated diagrammatically thus:-
Farm Survey Data : Imputed Cost Elements
i—- -----------------------------------
Valuation of Farm Assets
I___________________ ______________
Farm Cost/Expenditure Data
Investment Outlays Production Costs Living Expenses
"Sideline" Costs "Mainline" Costs
Yield Divisor
Unit Cost
As the diagram indicates imputed elements are also 
used in the process of conversion of raw farm survey data 
into farm cost and/or expenditure data. Capital expenditures 
(which are reflected in asset valuations) must be eliminated 
when they have been included in incurred costs and likewise 
living expenses. We then have total farm production costs 
identified. The next step is to split these production costs 
as between wheat production on the one hand and other (side­
line) production on the other. When the wheat costs have
been isolated, an appropriate yield factor is applied to them 
to convert them to a unit basis. The resulting costs are 
used as weights for the construction of a price index of cost 
items for the purpose of measuring (as a best approximation) 
the movement in wheat costs in respect of each year of a 
stabilization scheme.
Industry Average Cost as a
Cost-basis for Price
It was indicated above that survey cost data are 
processed into a weighted average cost figure to indicate the 
cost position of industry as a whole. Such a measure is just­
ified because conceptually if all producers were simultaneously 
in long period equilibrium their average cost of production 
(including land rent) would be equal to their marginal cost 
which in turn would be equal to the (equilibrium) price and 
thus the average of producers' costs would yield an acceptable 
cost figure for the industry as a whole. That, in fact, survey 
data reveal a wide range of cost experience is mainly due to 
variability in the climatic conditions experienced by individual 
producers in any given period as farmers’ outlays (except for 
harvesting costs) tend to be the same for all levels of yield: 
thus those who experience relatively favourable conditions 
would, cet. par., have lower costs of production than those 
who experience relatively unfavourable conditions. In addition, 
in any particular period actual yields for the industry may be 
higher or lower than expected yields. Ideally therefore we 
should endeavour to obtain a cost figure which does not reflect 
this uncontrollable factor in production.
Such a figure is the unit cost the producer expected; 
this could be taken to be expected total cost divided by expected 
yield. Expected yields are known (both regionally and nationally) 
and, given that the cost of a representative sample of 
producers may be obtained by survey, expected total costs 
ttould be computed by adjusting the average actual costs to 
reflect estimated unit cost on the basis of the expected yield.
We could expect that if such a calculation could be 
carried out on a farm-by-farm basis the true range of cost 
experience of producers would be shown to be greatly less than 
surveys suggest. However for other reasons e.g. the different 
notions of different producers as to costs and the deficiencies 
of survey data due to the notoriously poor records of farmers, 
we should still expect some variability in cost experience 
notwithstanding that there is some tendency for each of these - 
particularly the deficiencies of survey data - to be self­
balancing.
On balance it appears that the use, by a price fixer, 
of a weighted average cost figure based on survey costs 
adjusted for expected yield to obtain a guide to industry 
costs, would be justified.
It is frequently argued that if prices are set 
to cover the average cost of production, half of the producers 
would have higher than average costs. . But this argument 
relates to unit costs based on actual yields, whereas, as we 
have indicated, unit costs should be related to expected yields.
If unit costs based on expected yields showed significant
(1) See, e.g. , G-.S. Shepherd op. cit. p.181
dispersion and this were due to different levels of efficiency 
on farms then averaging of costs would yield a price which would 
(desirably) tend to encourage the low cost (efficient) and 
discourage the high cost (inefficient) producers.
Imputed Elements in Wheat Costs
The following cost items in the wheat cost of 
production formula embody imputed elements.
Owner-operator’s allowance 
Family labour
Return (Interest) on farm capital (including 
working capital) in respect of
(a) Basis of valuation of capital, and
(b) Rate of return (interest)
Depreciation
Seed
The use of these imputed elements in the wheat cost 
formula is explained under their respective headings.
Assessed wheat costs of production are also 
influenced by Government policy decisions in respect of -
(a) the basis ("sideline" criterion) used to 
apportion farm costs as between the different 
farm enterprises and,
(b) the basis (yield per acre) used for determining 
unit costs of production.
The existence of imputed elements in a cost formula 
for establishing a guaranteed price sterns logically from the 
objective of ensuring reasonable income levels for producers.
To achieve this the guaranteed price would need to reflect 
a return to each resource used in the productive process 
equal to its marginal value product in industry at large 
irrespective of whether in the industry to be stabilized, 
the M.V.P. of the resources, based on market forces, were 
lower. Assessment of such rates is comparatively uncomplicated 
since there is a considerable amount of data available on 
current earning rates of different classes of capital and 
labour.
The use of historical records of such incurred 
costs as hired labour, contract work, fuels, fertilizers, 
maintenance, etc., are of course essential in a cost formula 
as the best guide to these costs in the future, for well 
known reasons historical or recorded costs of family labour 
and seed often understate their real cost and unless suitable 
imputed costs are substituted for these incurred costs, the 
cost on which prices would be based would be unrealistically 
low and thus the objective of ensuring a reasonable income 
to the producer would be thwarted.
Valuation of Farm Assets
Land:
In the first two stabilization schemes, the basis 
used for the valuation of land was "long term security value", 
this was approximately 75$ of the market value.
In the third dtabilization Scheme, the Government 
accepted "fair market valuation" as the basis for valuing land 
and its improvements.
As indicated earlier this latter basis for valuing 
land for use in a cost formula for determining price is 
essential to achieve the policy objective o± income pariuy 
for farmers notwithstanding that it may otherwise have 
unfavourable economic consequences.
Plant and structures:
The basis for the valuation of plant wras original 
cost (actual or estimated) in each of the stabilization scheme. 
Theoretically, the valuation basis should have been replacement 
cost less depreciation. The effect of using original costs 
(as the valuation basis) is, in general, uo undeistate replace­
ment costs in periods of inflation (and vice versa).
Original cost less depreciation was the basis used
to value structures in the first and second stabilization
schemes; in the third scheme the theoretically desirable 
basis of replacement cost less depreciation was used.
Livestock:
In the first two schemes it appears that valuations 
allowed by the Taxation Department were adopted. The Depart­
ment while allowing flexibility in the choice of a basis of 
valuation nevertheless insisted on consistency in the use of 
a basis once it had been chosen by a producer. In consequence, 
survey data revealed different valuation bases on different 
farms; as an example of this, the values of livestock, notably 
natural increase, were found to be purely nominal in the tax 
records of some farmers. As a result, these valuations 
exercised a downward bias on gross cost assessments. In the 
third stabilization scheme values were based on survey farm 
records of purchases and sales. In the period of purchase 
and sale (i.e. in the survey period) these were, in effect, 
replacement values and thus consistent with theoretically 
desirable practice.
The use of these values unchanged throughout the 
course of a stabilization scheme(the existing practice) is 
justified on the basis that because of the use of the sideline 
cost deduction method wheat costs would vary with changes in 
livestock values. But this is incorrect because a change in 
livestock values would create (sideline) income identical in 
amount, thus leaving net wheat costs unchanged if the sideline 
deduction method were correctly applied. Thus, although it 
would have no effect on wheat costs, formal correctness in 
costing procedures would seem to require that livestock be 
valued on the basis of current market values.
Working Capital:
Working capital may be described as a liquid asset 
which complements physical capital: it arises out of outlays
made on account of inputs required for the production process, 
which are not of a capital nature: it is absolutely essential 
in the economic conduct of any industry and its supply price 
is an economic cost of production.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to obtain reliable 
data from farmers on working balances required in the conduct 
of their enterprises because their balances on private account 
cannot be disentangled from their balances on business account. 
Of course, even if it were possible to identify balances on 
business account, it would still require further judgement 
to decide whether these balances were higher or lower than 
would ordinarily be required.
In the third stabilization scheme, the amount of 
working capital required by the average wheat grower was 
related to the first advance, viz., 10/- per bushel, made 
by the Wheat Board in respect of wheat of a season delivered 
to the Board's receivers.
As average production on survey farms from which 
the base cost data for the third stabilization scheme were 
derived was 6,561 bushels, this meant that total outlays were 
assessed at £3,280. It was further estimated that the average 
period between outlays and receipt of the first advance was 
6 months and thus that the average level of working capital 
required over the year was £1,640.
The main objection to this method of assessing the 
level of working capital requirements is that it is based 
on the arbitrary figure of 10/- per bushel.
The most accurate way of handling this item would 
appear to be to make an assessment based on the average period 
of outlay in respect of each production cost'"^ incurred (l)
(l) There is no hard and fast way of handling sideline costs in 
this respect; probably direct arbitrary division of each 
cost would be adequate in most cases.
excluding only depreciation and return on equity. All or at 
least a large part of the owner operator's allowance should 
he included because farmers must inevitably make drawings 
from their business account to finance their daily living 
expenses . The average level of outlay (i.e. working 
capital requirements) is then given by the aggregation of 
the outlays in respect of each cost item weighted by the 
period it is outlaid.
The period of outlay in respect of each cost item is 
the interval between the date of the outlay and the date of the' 
sale of the crop, it being clear enough that any particular 
outlay can only be recouped upon sale of the commodity in 
respect of which the outlay was made. As virtually all wheat 
marketed is pooled and as sales from the pool are made inter­
mittently throughout the "marketing" year (which is the twelve 
month period following the "production" year), it is not readily 
apparent which date should be taken as the sale date. 
Conceptually, the appropriate date is given by the weighted
average sale date. This may be computed using the formula 
W T—U--- where T is the number of days between the beginning of
the marketing year and the date of each sale. W is the volume 
of wheat in each sale and N is the number of sales. This of 
course could not be calculated until the last sale of a pool 
had been made; however, as the cost is required at the 
beginning of the marketing year, it is obvious that it would 
have to be estimated - it should therefore be based on sales 
expectations which would normally have reference to recent
(2) On this point, Bellerby op.cit. p. 209, says that almost 
as much reserve may be required to maintain a farm family 
till cash is received from the crop as to pay wages to 
an equivalent labour force for the period.
experience. (l)(1)
(l) If working capital requirements and thus their cost
were to he assessed in the above manner, it would become 
necessary to eliminate from costs that part of the item, 
interest on borrowed funds, which related to the cost 
of working capital.
Allocation of Costs
As indicated in the diagram above, farm costs and/or 
expenditure data which is derived from basic survey data and 
imputed costs elements have to be separated into three components: 
viz., investment and living expenditures and production costs.
Investment Expenditure :
When considering investment in the context of cost 
allocation it is of course necessary to refer to gross investment. 
This may relate to either the improvement of and/or addition to 
land, and the replacement and/or addition to structures, plant 
and livestock.
The objective is to identify all components of 
investment expenditure and eliminate them from the survey 
expenditure data. Some items are simple to identify, for example, 
additional or replacement plant and livestock and additional 
land. Additional structures can sometimes be clearly accounted 
for, but it is the rule rather than the exception for farm 
producers to participate with their labour, skills and other 
equipment in the restoration of and additions to structures.
When this happens investment expenditure tends to be understated 
and production costs overstated, that is, with indistinguishable 
components of investment because it is virtually impossible to 
obtain anything like complete data on investment as farmers are 
unable to accurately assess for themselves how much of their 
economic activity is devoted to production and how much to 
development. This applies with special force to land improvements
In cost surveys, allowance is made for that part of 
the incurred costs which can be identified as investment expendi­
ture although it has not been the practice to charge any part of 
the owner— operator * s allowance to development costs. This treat­
ment of the owner—operator1s allowance introduces an upward bias 
in production costs.
Living Expenditure :
Data on incurred costs are obtained from farmer's tax 
records. These records show the division of the allowance for
depreciation of motor vehicles as between living expenditure 
and production costs, but no other items are specifically 
divided in this way, and except for depreciation^^the costs as 
they appear in tax records are accepted as genuine farm produc­
tion costs.
Self-Provision on Farms :
As it is normal for farmers to "live off the land" 
to at least some extent, i.e., by providing in whole or in part 
their own milk, butter, eggs and meat, etc., it is theoretically 
desirable to assess the extent to which production costs are 
affected as a result.
As no direct account has been taken of this fact in 
cost assessments, on the most reasonable interpretation it might 
be argued that the amount involved was small enough to be 
ignored or, alternatively, was implicitly taken into account in 
the fixing of the allowance for the owner-operator. Each one of 
these considerations contains at least a grain of truth. It 
would not be excessive, I feel, to place a yearly value of £150 
on self-consumed farm produce (£25 eggs, £100 meat and £25 milk) 
and assuming, as is reasonable, that the cost of producing such 
produce would approximate to this value, then the effect would 
be to add about 7d. to net wheat costs per bushel in respect of 
the Third Wheat Stabilization Scheme. Short of a survey there 
is no way of establishing whether a cost of this order is correct; 
however, if it were and if it were taken into account in the 
cost formula costs in the Third Wheat Stabilization Scheme would 
have been some 4$ lower. This suggests that the influence on 
costs of self-provision on farms is important enough not to be 
ignored in cost studies. 1
(1) because of accelerated depreciation provisions which farmers 
enjoy, tax records cannot be accepted as production costs 
and independent calculations based on normal rates of depre­
ciation are used instead.
Farmer's Residence :
Tne question of the inclusion of a farmer's resi­
dence in iarm assets for the purpose of assessing return on 
farm capital, depreciation, repairs, maintenance, etc., almost 
always crops up in cost-based pricing of farm products. There 
is no argument that residences provided for farm employees are 
in fact farm assets and as such should be treated in cost 
formulae on the same basis as any other farm asset. Farmers' 
residences have, on the other hand, been excluded from such 
treatment although the reasons for so doing do not seem to have 
reflected the basic considerations involved.
Given that the object of cost-based pricing is to 
stabilize producer's real incomes at reasonable levels, it is, 
as already indicated, necessary to set a price which will cover 
all costs including normal return on capital employed and adding 
to this aggregate of costs an allowance for the producer's own 
labour and managerial skill. As this allowance, familiarly 
known as the owner-operator's allowance, is based on the oppor­
tunity cost principle - the earning rate for comparable labour 
and management in industry generally - it will, in effect, have 
implicitly taken housing rental into account since a wage 
ordinarily provides the means by which wage earners acquire, 
according to their scale of preferences, their accommodation. 
Clearly then the cost of farmers' residences should not be 
incorporated in our cost formulae when the owner—operator's 
allowance is calculated in the above manner.
Production Costs :
Once investment and living expenditure have been 
eliminated from cost/expenditure data, the residual represents 
total farm production costs. These costs cover all farm pro­
duction activities and invariably relate to more than one farm 
commodity. To assess the cost of producing any one particular 
farm commodity, it is necessary to allocate to this commodixy a 
part of those costs which are common to the production of one 01
more of the other commodities produced. However, this task of 
allocation is almost certainly the most intractable problem in 
farm costing and is one that cannot be avoided by choosing only 
farmers specializing in only one commodity because, in respect 
of the wheat industry, this class of producer has virtually 
disappeared from the farm scene.
On this latter point, the Wheat Cost of Production 
Committee had this to say:-
During its investigations the Committee only dis­
covered one farmer whose sole product was wheat. With this 
exception the wheat farmers in Australia whom we interviewed or 
from whom we had returns were in a position to derive very con­
siderable revenues from wool, mutton, or fat lambs, or from 
other cereal crops, and many had other sidelines such as peas, 
potatoes, dairy produce. We are satisfied that the pure wheat 
farmers have ceased to play any part in the production of wheat 
in Australia!1).
Allocation of Costs of Production :
In each of the three post-war wheat stabilization 
schemes, the so-called "side line deduction method" which is 
based on the premise that normally side line cost is equal to 
sideline income, was used for the purpose of cost allocation.
Under this method costs are allocated as between 
the main and sideline activities according to some judgment as 
to the relationship that sideline income bears to sideline costs 
in the survey period. In this way, the problem of allocation of 
common costs as between one product and another is sidestepped 
but as we shall see at considerable cost in terms of accuracy.
In respect of the first stabilization scheme, the 
Wheat Cost Production Committee had before it an assessment that 
prices of sideline products were 171° above expected prices in 
the longer term when by definition the industry would be in 
equilibrium again and thus costs would again be equal to prices.
(1) Wheat Cost of Production Committee Report, page 7.
As the Committee considered that costs, in the 
survey period, were 2# above costs in the pre-survey period, it 
concluded that sideline income was about 15# (i.e. 17# - 2#) 
above sideline costs in the survey period and on this basis 
assessed sideline costs at 85# of sideline income.
In effect, in respect of the survey period, the 
Committee related an index number of costs on a pre-survey base 
to an index number of prices on a post-survey base. Now the only 
way in which these index numbers can be related is by assuming 
or establishing some sort of relationship between the two base 
periods. As the Committee did not establish any statistical 
relationship its conclusions must be taken to imply the following 
assumptions, viz:-
. that (sideline) costs equalled income in the pre­
survey period with the industry in (long period) 
equilibrium; and
. that when equilibrium is restored again in the 
future, costs and prices will again be equal at 
their pre-survey period levels.
The first of these assumptions, as it turns out, is 
the same as the basic assumption inherent in the sideline deduc­
tion method.
However, on theoretical grounds, neither of these 
assumptions can be justified and must be held to be unacceptable.
In dynamic economies long period equilibrium is an objective 
which is never attained before changing economic and technical 
conditions define new equilibrium conditions. Such changing 
conditions are reflected in the conditions prevailing in Australian 
agriculture in the late 1930's, the pre-survey period to which 
the Committee referred. 1
(1) Wheat Cost of Production Committee Report, para. 21. 
Actually it would have been arithmetically more proper 
to have worked from the ratio 117:102 which gives 
sideline costs as 87# of sideline income.
Further, costs in a defined short period can never 
be accepted as representing long period equilibrium costs 
because of the effects of short period influences on costs, as, 
for example, seasonal conditions which would almost certainly 
be either better or worse than average experience in the long 
run.
It therefore appears that as a result of the 
Committee's method of determining sideline costs, there is an 
(unknown) error which could be large and significant in the 
resulting wheat cost figures. This much may be said: if, in 
the pre-survey period, sideline costs were greater than sideline 
income (as seems possible) and not equated with sideline income 
as assumed, the effect would be to underestimate sideline cost 
and, as a result, over-estimate assessed wheat costs; and vice 
versa.
Apart from the objections on theoretical grounds to 
the determination of sideline costs by the sideline deduction 
method, the method is revealed as having further shortcomings 
in respect of the application of the sideline cost figure to 
gross costs to determine net wheat costs. This is because the 
method subsumes:-
(1) that the imputed rate of return on all capital 
(including sideline capital) is the same as the 
historical (survey period) rate of return to 
which the sideline income and sideline cost 
data relate; and
(2) that the imputed owner-operator1s allowance is 
the same as the actual return to the owner— 
operator in the survey period.
Clearly, however, these subsumptions (which relate 
to the two biggest items of cost) could not possibly be expected 
to hold: it follows therefore that net wheat costs cannot be 
taken to be the difference between gross costs (which are to an
important extent imputed) and sideline costs (which are based 
entirely on historical data). In other words the sideline 
deduction method cannot be held to be an acceptable basis for 
allocating costs between different farm activities.
In the second stabilization scheme the concept of 
sideline costs underwent a radical change. Y/hereas in the 
first scheme, it was defined in the economic sense which 
includes normal profit, in the second scheme it was defined in 
the narrow commercial sense, which excludes (all) profit. The 
weakness of such a concept of sideline costs may be illustrated 
arithmetically as follows:-
Assume gross cost (including normal profit) is 110, 
normal profit being 10 units.
Assume further that sideline enterprise comprises 
one-half of total farm activity. Y/e then get sideline costs 55 
and net industry cost 55. Both of these figures include normal 
profit (equal to 5 units). Sideline cost (excluding profit) is 
thus 50, which is the figure that theoretically would be arrived 
at via the side-line deduction method and which would then be 
deducted from the total cost of 110 to obtain net industry costs. 
But clearly this is wrong for it leaves the imputed profit in 
respect of sideline capital in this residual (net cost) figure.
In other words net (wheat) industry costs are loaded by the 
imputed profit (return) on sideline capital.
The effect of the above on the assessment of wheat 
costs is considerable. In the 1958/59 season, for example, the 
item, Interest (Return on Farm Capital) was assessed at 67.I8d 
per bushel (gross cost basis). The industry structure is such 
that more than half of gross costs is allocated to sideline 
enterprise.^1 * If we assume (and very broadly, it is plausible 
to do so) that the capital-output (or income) ratio is the same
(l) Sideline income was rather more than 50°/° of total farm 
income.
(1)for each farm activity^ ythen more than half of the "Interest" 
item applies to sideline activity. On this basis net costs 
were more than 33d. per bushel lower than assessed.
Apart from the above weakness, the concept involves 
the same two theoretically unacceptable subsumptions inherent 
in the concept of sideline cost as used in the first scheme, 
and in addition a third one, namely:
o that the imputed cost of family labour is the
same as the actual return to family labour in
the survey period.
In the consideration of sideline costs in the second 
scheme, it was also supposed that changes in wool prices would 
cause an apparent change in the cost of producing wheat, thus -
"Nevertheless, to load all the profit from wool 
(and other sidelines) against wheat would be inequitable and 
would lead to the situation where a change in wool prices and 
hence in the profitability of producing wool, would cause an 
apparent change in the cost of producing wheat, even though 
there might have been no change in the prices of the factors 
of wheat production."
This is erroneous for assuming the method could be 
adapted to assess sideline cost on the same basis as gross cost 
was assessed, the method would not be invalidated by subsequent 
changes in prices of sidelines and its use over the course of a 
stabilization scheme could be justified as follows
(o)We may take as our starting point the total cost ' 
of the average farm (this implies individual costs cannot be 
separately allocated which in itself is mainly true). We need 
a means for allocating costs between main and sideline enter­
prises. We know sideline income. We assume (correctly, say) 
that there is normal profit (return to capital) and normal 1 2
(1) That is to say, if sideline capital bears the same 
relation to total capital as sideline income bears to 
total income.
(2) defined to include normal return to capital and labour.
returns to labour in respect of sidelines. Therefore sideline 
cost defined to include normal return to capital and labour 
equals sideline income. The relationship of sideline cost (so 
determined) to total costs gives us a factor with which to 
allocate costs between farm enterprises.
If costs and prices remain stable and there is no 
structural change, i.e., the composition of inputs and outputs 
is unchanged then clearly a cost allocation factor, once deter­
mined, holds good.
If costs remain stable and prices change (in any 
direction and by any amount) but there is no structural change, 
the cost allocation factor continues to hold good. This is 
necessarily so as the cost level and each individual cost item 
(reflecting the farm structure) is exactly as in the base period. 
Thus, having once determined a cost allocation factor, its con­
tinued validity depends solely on the matter of structural 
change - if there is no structural change, the factor retains 
its validity.
Thus, if costs change, prices remain unchanged and 
there is no structural change (which means cost must change 
uniformly^1'in relation to each farm activity) the cost alloca­
tion factor, continues to be valid.
Likewise, if costs and prices both change and there 
is no structural change (which again means costs must move 
uniformly) the cost allocation factor is still good.
(1) If costs do not move uniformly then immediately there is a 
structural change in industry costs and the Index Method 
becomes invalid. In practice minor structural changes via 
differential changes in cost items are occurring all the 
time but until these in the aggregate become significant 
the Index Method for all practical purposes retains its
validity.
In general, then, the cost allocation factor 
retains its validity "between one survey and the next, assuming 
the latter survey is held as soon as necessary, i.e., following 
a (significant) structural change in the industry.
The validity of the above reasoning, namely, that 
in any period subsequent to the base period, the use of the 
base period cost allocation factor is valid and that it returns 
precisely the same results as are obtainable by reference to 
changes in (and hence new assessments of) sideline profitability, 
may be demonstrated arithmetically as follows
In period 0 we have : Gross Cost = 100, Sideline
Income = 40, Sideline Cost Assumption (sideline
cost = sideline income) therefore Sideline Cost = 40
(therefore sideline cost allocation factor 
40jqq = 0.4), therefore net cost = 60.
In period 1 we assume costs rise 10$. The present 
method then gives : Gross Cost = 110 to which the 
application of the cost allocation factor (0.4) 
gives sideline costs = 44; therefore Net Costs = 66.
An identical result is given by assessing net costs 
in period 1 according to the method used in period 0.
Thus : assessment of sideline profitability in 
period 1, in the light of higher costs and unchanged 
prices, indicates that sideline production now 
involves a loss. We assume (correctly, again) that 
we are now making a 10$ loss; therefore sideline 
cost now equals 110$ of sideline income which is 
unchanged at 40; therefore sideline cost equals 
40 x 110$ = 44. Therefore net cost equals 110 - 44 = 66 
as given by the present method,
These exercises may be repeated in respect of all 
combinations of price and cost changes, but in the absence of 
structural change and so long as the relationship of sideline 
cost to sideline income can be assessed accurately in the first 
place, the use of the base period cost allocation factor will
always be found to be correct.
li, however, sideline profitability were incorrectly 
assessed in the base period, the resulting cost allocation 
factor would, of course, be incorrect in respect of all periods 
including the base period.
In its report on the 1950 Wheat Survey, the Ad Hoc 
Wheat Cost of Production Committee alluded to the residual 
values of fertiliser which accrue to wool production as a 
result of the consumption of wheat stubble by sheep. This 
matter was also cited by the Wheat Cost of Production Committee 
in its report on the 1957 Wheat Survey, as an example of the 
difficulties of allocating costs to different farm activities.
Whilst there can be no denying that there are costs 
for which it is practically impossible to make allocations 
between different farm activities, it seems that the choice of 
the above one is inappropriate in the circumstances. Generally 
speaking, in Australia, wheat producers apply what could be 
termed as traditional quantities of fertilizer to wheat lands. 
Over the years farmers are known to have experimented on test 
plots or strips with different rates of fertilizer application 
and apparently they have satisfied themselves that existing 
rates are best. One particular problem militating against 
higher rates of application is the low moisture content of the 
soil. Relatively high rates of application of fertilizer have 
been found to cause the wheat plant to grow to such a size as 
cannot be sustained by the relatively low moisture content of 
the soil in the later stages of growth. In other words, it is 
not the practice of producers to apply a 11 little extra" for the 
benefit of the sheep. Insofar as this is true, then it can be 
said that it is the producer's intention to apply fertilizer 
solely in respect of his planned wheat crop and thus that all 
the fertilizer should be regarded as an input for this wheat 
crop. If some fertilizer is lost due to wind or if an undue 
amount is leached away due to excessive rain, these quantities
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do not cease for these reasons to he costs; and, in the same 
way, unintentional residues of fertiliser left in the soil do 
not cease to be direct wheat costs. But this does not deny that 
they may still reduce costs of wool production.
In 1958, the Wheat Cost Committee gave still further 
consideration to the sideline deduction method. Its observation 
that "it is quite adequate as a method for determining the 
structure of costs as a basis for assessing movements in total 
costs in succeeding years" is an inaccurate one for the method 
has nothing to do with the determination of the structure of 
costs. The observation made by the Ad Hoc Committee in its 
report on the 1950 Wheat Survey on the effect of changes in wool 
prices was repeated in the 1950 survey report; thus "If the 
price of wool, for example, is particularly high in any one 
year, then the deduction from gross costs is so much higher and 
the residual representing wheat costs is correspondingly low".
However, as pointed out above, this observation is 
erroneous. The Committee's further reference to a not un­
reasonable price expectation of 70d. seems to be quite irrele­
vant to the matter in hand.
The Committee observed that "the adoption of an 
appropriate rate of profit on sidelines tends to make the side­
line deduction method more realistic" and "profitability may be 
expressed as a ratio between total gross returns and total gross 
costs". "The ratio for a rate of profitability of 10$ may be 
written as that is to say, total gross returns are 10$ higher 
than costs".
As in the second stabilization scheme, this concept 
of sideline costs is inacimissable because it relates profit­
ability to output and sales rather than to capital and thus 
makes the resulting'of sideline cost noncomparable with gross
costs, in which "profitability" is related to capital. The 
concept is also deficient with respect to the subsumptions 
of the sideline cost concept noted in respect of the first 
two stabilization schemes.
In its consideration of profitability of sidelines, 
the Wheat Costs Committee worked from the profitability ratio 
used in the 1950 Wheat Survey Report, namely, ratio of gross
sideline income to gross sideline cost which was assessed at
110-^-qq • The Wheat Cost Committee then applied to the numerator 
of this ratio on the one hand, the change in gross returns for 
sideline items (for all industry) during the 1950/57 period and 
to the denominator on the other hand the change recorded by the 
Index of Prices Paid by Farmers during the same period. The 
resulting ratio was then taken to indicate the rate of profit­
ability of sidelines in respect of the 1957 survey.
In adjusting the numerator of the ratio, which it 
used as a starting point, the Committee took account of changes 
in both volume and price. However, in adjusting the denominator 
it took account only of price change, that is to say, the 
Committee made no allowance in its calculations for the increased 
inputs which complemented the increased output, and thus ascribed 
the total increase in output entirely to increased productivity. 
The Committee did in fact indicate this short-coming and pointed 
to evidence of striking increases in some inputs but gave scant 
weight to these indications in its overall assessment.
In the circumstances, more accurate figuring would 
have resulted had the numerator of the commencing ratio been 
adjusted with respect to price change only. As the prices of 
gj_c[QTiftgs increased only about 44/ over the period a very much 
different "profit" rate would have been obtained. In fact, a 
"loss" rate of almost 20/ would have been indicated.
These results would have implied a productivity 
factor of nil for the period, instead of an average annual 
productivity factor of over 5/° per annum given by the Committee's
calculation. As actual production increased by 14$ (about 2$ 
per annum) in the period under reference, then clearly there 
would have had to have been a dramatic reduction in inputs to 
have given the figures some order of respectability, but this 
is entirely lacking for the evidence indicates an unmistakable 
increase in inputs. In other words, the productivity factor 
though almost certainly positive could not nearly have had the 
influence implicitly ascribed to it by virtue of the Committee's 
conclusions.
In the light of the foregoing there does not appear 
to be any justification whatsoever for the use of the sideline 
deduction technique as a method of allocating costs between 
different enterprises. This being so, the question arises : 
what is the best feasible way by which costs may be allocated? 
More research is required to answer this question, but material 
already available suggest that several methods could be developed 
that would be more accurate than the sideline deduction method.
(1)Kinsman^ yexperimented with regression analysis as 
a method of allocating costs. He found that the relationship 
between gross cost per bushel and sideline income per bushel 
gave a "remarkably good fit to a straight line". On the basis 
of this relationship, he was able to compute gross farm cost as 
a measure of net wheat costs when sideline income was zero.
However, it became apparent to Kinsman that wheat 
costs computed in this way would only be valid for farms with 
high yields per acre and that "unless one was prepared to accept 
the cost of producing wheat on high-yielding farms as the cost 
of production, it was necessary to find some alternative 
solution." 1
(1) K.L. Kinsman : Estimating Production Costs on Mixed
Fa,rms : Paper presented at AN'ZAAS Conference, Jan. 1954.
He then, tried partial regression analysis using 
different sets of variables and concluded from this work that 
it should be possible to arrive at a reasonable allocation of 
costs on mixed farms by such methods.
Standard costing is another line of enquiry which 
deserves earnest consideration. Various forms of this costing
(i)basis are m use in European countriesv 'and they appear to be 
vastly superior to the sideline deduction technique as a method 
of allocating costs. In terms of policy objectives, the more 
we reorient price determination from a purely "found" cost of 
production basis to an acceptable efficiency level basis, the
(p)more the notion of standard costs commends itself. As Saxonv ' 
has pointed out, the efficiency standard, to give it accept­
ability, could be one agreed to by growers' representatives.
Some valuable exploratory work on estimating wheat 
costs of production in Australia on a standard cost basis has 
already been carried out by McLennan1" ~ ^ * 1 2 3
(1) See, for example, E.A. Saxon : Farm Records and Their 
Importance for Management and Policy, Quarterly Review 
of Agricultural Economics, July, 1961 and January, 1962.
(2) Op. cit.
(3) L.W. McLennan : Estimated cost of wheat production per 
bushel, Bureau of Agricultural Economics (unpublished
paper).
Yield Factor for Conversion of Total Costs to Unit Costs
Total farm cost less costs attributable to sideline 
enterprises gives total wheat costs. As price is set on a 
unit of production basis, these costs must also be expressed 
on a unit basis. Unit costs and thus price (in cost-based 
pricing) are, of course, powerfully affected by the choice 
of the yield divisor. Thus to use a yield factor which is 
higher than expected future yields and which would in turn 
make assessed costs lower than producers expected, would 
cet. par., tend to discourage production because producers 
would not then expect the resulting (cost-based) price to 
give an adequate return on their labour and capital. And 
vice versa. It follows that to achieve industry stabilization 
unit cost of production (and thus the guaranteed price) would 
need to be calculated on the basis of expected yields.
Variable seasonal conditions are the major cause 
of year to year fluctuations in yields. In this regard there 
is a probability of a calamitous drought one year in twenty, 
of a moderate to severe drought one year in four or five, as 
well as the respective probabilities of average, good and 
excellent seasons (and any other category of season not mentions 
Quite clearly farmers’ yield expectations must be related to 
these probabilities. Accordingly, in the determination of 
industry's average yield expectations reference is made to 
yield experience over a past period long enough to reflect 
the effects of the full cycle of seasonal conditions.
In this respect the actual yield experienced by survey 
farms in the survey years is not regarded as adequate for this 
purpose because the survey period is too short to typify 
farmeis' average yield experience and thus their expectations.
Yield Expectations:
Let us assume that the complete "cycle" of farmers' 
yield experience (ranging from best possible to worst possible)
takes 20 years (in fact this time span roughly accords with 
actual experience). Assume also that there is no trend in 
yields. It follows that the (statistically) expected yield 
must be the (simple) average of the average yields of the 
past 20 years. If, on the other hand, there is a trend (let 
us say upwards) in yields, then obviously average past 
performance will not give the statistically expected yield 
for any future season. In fact, when there is trend in yields, 
as indeed there has been over aXrery long period of time, the 
statistically expected yield will be different in each future 
year. Thus, assuming that yields have been increasing in 
arithmetic progression and this trend is expected to continue, 
then the statistically expected future yields will rise in the 
same arithmetic progression.
It will be noted that we are discussing statistically 
expected yields rather than the notional (weighted) average 
of farmers' individual yield expectations. The reason for 
this is that the two are not likely to be identical. If there 
has been a rising trend in yields over a long period, farmers 
are likely to become less optimistic about the trend continuing 
particularly if unanticipated technological factors affecting 
yield are involved (in this regard, for example, myxomatosis 
and new higher yielding wheat varieties). Also some farmers 
(and it is farmers who make the production decisions) are 
not beyond speculating on the season and whilst in this regard 
optimism would be likely to be: .mixed with pessimism (or 
vice versa) one would not necessarily expect a perfect balance 
between the two.
In respect of the first stabilization scheme, the 
Wheat Cost of Production Committee determined its (reasonable) 
unit cost of production figure on the basis of actual survey
yields 1 ^. This necessarily implies that the Committee 
considered that yield experience in the survey period was 
typical of average experience for otherwise the assessed 
cost figure could not be described as reasonable outside 
of its reference period. In fact, the survey yield figure 
(11.95 bushels) was about higher than the previous 20 
year average figure for the industry as a whole and a bit 
less than 1 °/q higher than the . 10 years average figure. When 
trend is taken into account these differences are narrowed 
so that the yield figure can be accepted as having valid 
reference to the first year (1947-48) of the Stabilization 
Scheme. However, if the correction for acreage bias (see 
footnote (l)) significantly changed the average yield 
figure and, prima facie, this appears to be so then, to 
this extent, this yield figure does not have valid reference 
outside of the survey period which ended in 1946/47.
(1) However, the sample was considered to have an acreage
bias in that it was over weighted by large acreage farms. 
This presumed bias was corrected by weighting total wheat 
production and total net costs for each cost group, by 
the ratio of the theoretical number to the actual number 
of farms in each group. Broadly, this meant that the 
weight accorded smaller farms was increased. As there is 
only the remotest possibility that the weighted average 
yield of these farms could have coincided with the 
weighted average yield of the larger farms which were 
"Weighted" out of the sample, we must assume that the 
average yield after correction for acreage bias differ­
ed from the original figure of 11.95 bushels per acre.
In Tables I and II of the Committee’s Report, the 
acreage bias conversion factors in respect of total 
wheat production can be obtained within each cost group. 
These factors can be applied to the (uncorrected) 
acreages in Table I to give an approximation to the 
figure of corrected acreages. This figure, when applied 
to the corrected production figure in Table II of the 
Report, gives an approximation to the average yield 
figure implied in the Committee's assessment. The result 
is 11.8 bushels per acre.
The best fitting straight line to the average yields 
in the 21 year period ending with 1947-48 (the first year of 
the Stabilization Scheme) is I = 0.08x + 11.86. This indicate 
a slight upward trend in yields. The computed yields (i.e. 
the statistical expectations) in respect of each of the six 
years of the first Stabilization Scheme averaged out at 
12,86 bushels per acre which is well in advance of the actual 
figure used. But even this figure was well below the actual 
yields experienced which averaged out at 16.53 bushels.
After unit costs had been determined in respect of 
the first year of the first scheme, the question of how- 
yield should be treated in the subsequent years of the scheme 
arose. It was suggested that estimated yields of each 
season might be used. This approach was rejected on what 
seems to me to be for the most part unacceptable grounds.
It was claimed that yields varied widely from season to 
season (which is true in itself) and that in consequence 
there would be "marked changes in costs per bushel notwith­
standing that costs per acre may remain relatively stable".
In itself, this is a truism but it is intended to imply 
that there is something wrong with "marked changes in
costs per bushel.... " One could reasonably believe that
the use of the word "notwithstanding" implied that it would 
not be right if unit costs varied while per acre costs were 
stable. But this is of course precisely what does happen 
when nontypical season are experienced. The point is 
then made that it would be undesirable from the price fixing 
aspect in that it would cause the home consumption price to 
jump around. However, this would not have been necessary 
at all. Certainly the producer prices would have fluctuated 
(inversely with the change in yields so that producers got 
reasonable overall returns in relation to their total costs) 
but the home consumption price of wheat could have been set 
at any arbitrary level (say on the basis of the statistically 
expected yield) given the enabling legislation. This would
have meant that in some years the consumer price would have 
"been greater than the producer price and thus that the 
Wheat Board, as selling agent, would have paid the difference 
into the Stabilization Fund while in other years, when the 
reverse applied, payment would have been made out of the 
Stabilization Fund. This would likewise have applied in 
respect of the export price/guaranteed price differential 
for that part of the export crop subject to the guaranteed 
price. The further argument against using the estimated 
yield, namely, that errors in the estimate led to marked 
variations in costs (and then to the possibility of over­
payment) can also be rebutted. This suggests growers are 
paid cash on delivery but in fact Wheat Pools are never wound 
up inside of one year by which time actual yields are known; 
thus the present system of making progressive advances 
throughout the selling season (as more detail became 
available) would seem to be capable of extension to cope with 
the problem of errors in estimated yields.
In the second scheme, four bases for assessing a 
yield figure were considered namely (i) a 20-year moving 
average, (ii) an arbitrarily increasing yield, (iii) a 
constant yield on arbitrary or historical bases and (iv) 
an annually adjusted yield.
The two things to note about these are that (ii) 
and (iv) do not specify a basis for determining a commencing 
yield and that (i) is consistent with (iv). This means that 
the four bases were not sufficiently deiined to be clear 
alternatives to each other. The issues involved are, 
however, implicit : should the yield figure be set on an 
arbitrary or historical basis, should the yield be adjusted 
annually, and if so, should it be adjusted on an arbitrary
or historical basis?
In the event the moving average was rejected for 
4 reasons none of which are valid. The basic reason why it 
should be regarded as inappropriate is that as yields were 
on an upward trend past averages would necessarily under­
state the statistically expected yield. The first of the 
four reasons is that the 20 year average could rise (or fall) 
when the actual yield fell. This, of course, could happen, 
but that is not a case for rejecting it, because the same 
must hold true in respect of any yield figure used (other 
than perhaps the estimate of the actual yield). As regards 
the second reason that the yield would be affected by 
conditions of 20 years ago, the basic concept of an average 
has clearly been overlooked because a 20 year average gives 
equal weight to each one of the 20 years figures involved 
and as pointed out above a 20 year average would be 
appropriate for Australia in the absence of trend. Reason 3, 
that variations could be appreciable, would be utterly wrong 
if there were no trend (as was implicitly assumed) since 
the average would in fact represent the expected yield. 
Moreover, the variations cotild be expected to be self­
balancing over a period so that, in the absence of a trend 
adjustment which was ignored anyway, the 20-year average 
would reasonably represent the expected yield. The final 
and least objectionable reason for rejecting the 20-year 
moving average was that it would vary each year, whereas 
expected yields would not. But the movement in the 20- 
year moving average is only a symptom of trend which by 
all reasonable statistical standards commends itself as a 
better approximation of expected yields.
finally, the Committee adopted a fixed yield of 
13.35 bushels per acre, the average of the previous 20
This of course ignores trend and thus on averageyears.
it could be expected to understate future yields.
The Government considered the figure too low and 
lifted it to 13.5 bushels per acre, the mean of the previous 
20 year and 1.5 year average yields. This meant that yields 
of the previous 15 years each received a weight of 2 while a 
weight of 1 was allotted to the yields in each of the 
earliest 5 years taken into account. Whilst this could be 
regarded as a step in the right direction this sort of 
technique could never actually give the best possible assess­
ment of the statistically expected yield. The statistically 
expected yield in the second scheme averaged out at 16.26 
bushels per acre, which compares with the average of actual 
yields of 16.3 bushels per acre.
In the third stabilization scheme, the yield factor 
was reviewed again. The moving average was rejected for 
the same invalid reasons as given in the second scheme and 
thus not for the (correct) reason'that it ignores trend.
The Committee came out in favour of the mean of the 10 
and 20 years (15.5 bushels) thus giving a weight of 2 to 
each of the ten most recent years. But as indicated above 
this method does not fully take trend into account and thus, 
cet. par., would tend to underestimate actual average yields.
In the first four years of the third scheme, the 
statistically expected yield averaged out at 17.77 bushels 
per acre which compares with the average of the actual yields 
of 18.54 bushels. In the table below, it will be noted that 
average actual yields have not co-incided with either the 
average of official yield figures or the average of the 
calculated statistically expected yield figures. Some 
difference in the figures would not be surprising,^ but (l)
(l) Since expected and average yields need never quite
balance out because of the vagaries of climate, etc.
the considerable differences actually exhibited do suggest 
that more than random factors contributed to this position.
In the first place, the difference between the statistically 
expected yields and official yield figures as explained above 
is due to the fact that trend was not taken into account in 
the official figures. The difference between the average 
of the statistically expected yields and the average of the 
actual yields is also associated with trend in that there 
has been a fairly marked increase in the rate of increase 
of average yields. This, of course, points to the deficiency 
of describing the trend in yields with a curve of the first 
degree i.e> the best fitting straight line. However yields 
cannot be expected to go on increasing at an increasing rate 
and sooner or later the rate of increase, cet. par., must 
start to decline; when this happens estimated future yields 
based on the best fitting straight line would tend to 
overstate yields. On 1 . balance it would seem that if 
official yields were set each year on the basis of the 
statistically expected yields computed from the equation 
to the best fitting straight line of recorded yields they 
would be as much as any theoretician might desire having 
regard to future uncertainties concerning trend and farmers* 
attitudes thereto.
Imputed Yield in Relation to Harvesting Costs
It is not valid of course to obtain unit costs by 
dividing the expected yield figure into aggregate wheat costs 
because some harvesting costs, for example, harvest labour, 
cornsacks and wheat cartage are the same on a per bushel 
basis whatever the yield happens to be. To get over this 
problem, unit cost of production is first determined using 
the actual survey yield. This figure is then adjusted after 
first eliminating harvest labour, cornsacks and cartage by 
the ratio of actual yield to expected yield after which the
three eliminated items are added back at their actual unit 
cost in the survey period.
The chief apparent weakness in this method of adjus 
ment is that it takes no account of the use of a farmerfe 
own plant, fuel, etc., and labour in the harvesting process.
For example, an investigation^1'of H.S.W. survey 
data in respect of the 1957 Wheat Industry Survey indicates 
that the real cost of cartage (as one element in harvesting 
costs) in IT.Swas about 7d. per bushel in the survey 
period compared with the figure of approximately Id. per 
bushel indicated in the official cost figures. As this 
amount is relatively large in the context of harvesting 
costs, prima facie, there is a good case for attempting to 
take it into account also.
As regards the owner-operator's allowance, it 
would not be appropriate to attempt to make an adjustment 
because, by Government decision, the full amount of this 
allowance must be allowed as a cost. Whether an adjust­
ment was warranted on economic grounds would depend strictly 
speaking on whether the allowance was based on itemized 
work value or opportunity cost. However in this context it 
would seem sensible and desirable to treat the allowance as 
if it were an overhead cost.
With respect to depreciation (of wheat harvesting 
and cartage vehicles) there is a more tenuous line of 
argument. Depreciation rates are based on average experience 
of the life of plant, etc., and thus, in respect of harvest­
ing assignments covering any of a fairly wide range of yields 
which would of course embrace normally expected yields, the 
standard rate of depreciation could be taken as an accept­
(l) A.E, Cox, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Canberra, 
Wheat Cartage Costs in N.S.W., (unpublished).
able approximation of the actual rate of depreciation.^ 
Fuel and oil is perhaps the only other item 
warranting discussion in the present context. As the cost 
of fuel and oil used in harvesting vehicles would for all 
practical purposes depend directly on the size of the 
harvest as a function of both acreage and yield, clearly 
it is desirable as far as practicable to make allowance 
for this when converting unit costs from an actual to an 
expected yield basis. (l)
(l) It would of course be most unlikely for an extremely 
abnormal year for yields (and resulting abnormal 
harvesting costs) to be chosen as part of a survey 
period.
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AVERAGE WHEAT YIELDS, IMPUTED YIELDS
IN WHEAT COST FORMULAE AND STATISTICALLY EXPECTED YIELDS
1947-48 TO 1961-62
Year
Actual Yield
"bush/acre
Imputed Yield
"bush/acre
Statistically 
Expected Yield* 
"bush/acre
1947-48 15.9 12.0 12.66
49 15.2 12; 0 12.74
50 17.8 12.0 12.82
51 15.8 12,0 12.90
52 15.4 12.0 12.98
53 19.1 12.0 13.06
54 18.4 13.5 15.80
55 15.8 13.5 16.03
56 19.2 13.5 16.26
57 17.1 13.5 16.49
58 11,0 13.5 16.72
59 20.7 15.5 17.35
60 16.3 15.5 17.63
61 20.4 15.5 17.91
62 16.8 15.5 18.19
Average(15 years) 17.0 13.4 15.30
* Based on least squares method applied to the actual 
yields in the 21 years preceding the commencement 
year of each of the three stabilization schemes.
Return to Farm Capital
Scs-
Farm assets may Toe briefly described as land and 
improvements, structures, plant, livestock and working 
capital. Given the value of these assets, the return to 
farm capital allowed will depend on the degree of equity 
a farmer has in these assets on the one hand and the rate of 
return to be allowed on the other. As regards the assets in 
which the farmer has no equity and which were acquired with 
borrowed funds or against which funds were borrowed, the 
return allowed is given by the cost of the borrowed funds.
The measurement of a farmer's equity in his farm 
is in theory a relatively straight forward matter; it is 
the total value of farm assets less the total amount of 
funds borrowed. The valuation of farm assets has already 
been discussed and need not concern us here. The total 
amount of funds borrowed could be obtained by industry 
survey. The interest bill paid by the farmer is usually 
available as a separate item and if data were collected 
showing the amounts of interest paid at each rate of interest, 
if there were more than one, it would be possible to capitalize 
the interest bill to deduce the total amount of borrowed capital a 
farmer had. Whilst this procedure would yield an accurate 
assessment of borrowed capital, it nevertheless would not 
quite go far enough because we need to know in addition to 
the amount of borrowed capital, the purpose of this capital. This 
is required to enable borrowings for working capital purposes 
to be separated from other borrowed capital and eliminated 
from costs because working capital is an item which presents 
special difficulties which make it necessary to compute it 
separately. In the 1957/58 wheat survey, the data collected 
on borrowed funds was almost sufficient to permit proper 
processing of this item.
In the first wheat stabilization scheme, the 
borrowed capital was estimated from interest paid by capita­
lizing the interest bill at the trading bank overdraft rate 
(as trading banks have traditionally been the main source of 
farmers' borrowings). This assessed total of borrowings was 
then deducted from the value of farm assets to give farmers' 
equity. Borrowed capital was then allowed as a cost on the 
basis of the actual amount of interest paid and return on 
farmers' equity was costed at a specially chosen rate - the 
long term bond rate of interest. It would appear that interest 
on working capital would have comprised some part of interest 
on borrowed capital.
In the second and third stabilization schemes actual
interest payments made by farmers were completely eliminated
from cost tabulations and instead of the two items, r,turn on
equity and interest on borrowed capital, a single item,
interest on capital, was introduced. The interest allowed on
this i :;em was the current Trading Bank overdraft rate. There
are of course considerable computational advantages associated
with this procedure without, it appears, any serious additional
compromise with accuracy, if it can be accepted that this one
rate of interest is appropriate for all farm capital. This is
doubtful as hire purchase agreements have become more and more
popular with farmers as a means of finance and rates of interest
under these arrangements are significantly higher than trading
bank overdraft rates to producers. It could however be
argued that as farmers' indebtedness is only small (8$)
in relation to the capital value o their farms, che effects ox
any inaccuracies resulting from the simplification of procedures
would not be significant. This may well be true. Nevertheless,
the method has a theoretical weakness in that it uses a common
rate in respect of return on equity and interest on borrowed
capital which may well have little or no justification in ocher 
periods of time.’ If, for example, the bond yield were to be
used to assess the return on equity, could this 
rate which is mostly below 5% also be regarded as satisfactory 
in respect of borrowed capital, the rate of interest on which 
appears to have averaged over 5z° p.a. Evidently not.
e turn now to discuss the rate of return to be 
allowed in respect of a farmer's equity in his farm. In terms 
of the criterion of income parity this rate should be 
based on current earning rates of capital. However, the 
modern capital market represents a bewildering variety of assets 
each with its own combination of those qualities (illiquidity 
in the narrow sense, capital uncertainty, lender's risk and 
income uncertainty) , which put them at a disadvantage in relation 
to money (l); it is not therefore a simple task to decide 
which particular rate of return is appropriate in respect of 
a farmer's equity in his farm.
The farmer's position is that he is most concerned 
about income uncertainty, that is to say, he is interested 
in securing an assured reasonable income from his enterprise : 
he is much less concerned about capital uncertainty - the risk of 
changes in the value of his equity due to changes in interest 
rates - since as a general rule he will not be planning to 
sell his equity. In this respect, the farmer is in the 
category of an income-cautious investor, typically the holder 
of long term bonds; both are seeking income certainty .
What about risk? Farming enterprise is normally 
regarded as a high risk proposition, because of price 
uncertainty on the one hand and production uncertainty on me 
other. The risk of lower then expected returns from the sale 
of farm commodities is undoubtedly the major risk facing farmers 
today. However, under a cost-based, pricing policy, this risk 
is entirely eliminated. On the supply side, une ... i ! - i- io 
adverse climatic conditions. Again however the risk is 
eliminated by cost-based prices because of the manner, in 
(l) Joan Robinson : The Rate of Interest and Other Essays pp5-7.
earlier, in which the yield divisor (based on expected yields) 
is handled in the cosu lormula. In any event adverse climatic 
conditions are certain to "balance out" in the long run.
For farmers as individuals there will still be some 
enterprise risks. 1’he chief of these is probably disease, 
but in the overall picture it is not very significant.
Fire is a definite risk of course but this is 
covered in a large measure by insurance, the cost of which 
is incorporated in the cost formula. It is apparent then 
that the main risks associated with farming enterprise are 
eliminated by a cost-based price. It is only reasonable 
therefore that the return allowed on farmer's equity should 
reflect this fact.
he have argued above that the farmer is income 
cautious like the bond holder and that under a cost-based 
price policy he avoids nearly all the risk associated with 
farm enterprise. To what class of bond holder, we need to 
consider, does this situation apply?
In Australia, a bond holder who desires to 
minimize the income risks of bond holding would hold Commonwealth 
Government securities. The yield on these securities may 
therefore be r :garded as the appropriate rate of return to 
allow in respect of farmers' equity.
In the first wheat stabilization scheme, the rate 
selected for return on equity was the rate of interest on 
long term Commonwealth loans, viz., 3.25$. This rate was 
slightly (3fo) above the bond yield of 3*15h which we have 
suggested as an apporpriate rate, and once a security has 
been selected for indicating the rate of return to be allowed 
on farmer's equity, there should be no question whether the 
earning rate on the face value of the bond or the current 
yield is appropriate : the only rate which is meaningful is
the current yield.
In the second and third wheat stabilization 
schemes, the Government decided to allow return on farmers 
equity at the Trading Bank overdraft rate throughout the 
life of these schemes. Except for one period in 1956, thi 
rate was in excess of the yield on long term Commonwealth 
bonds.
A comparison of the rate of return allowed on 
farmers' equity and the yield on long term Government 
securities is given in the following table:-
(1)
Year
Wo,
(2) (3) (4)
Rate Allowed 
Wheat Cost 
Formula.
m
$
Yield on long 
term Common­
wealth Bonds 
(a) (b)
$
Relative
(2) + (3)
$
1947/48 3.25 3.15 103.2
48/49 3.25 3.15 103.2
49/50 3.25 ■ 3.13 103.2
50/51 3-25 3.15 103.2
51/52 3-75 3.51 106.8
52/53 3.75 4.62 81.2
53/54 5.0 4.48 116.6
54/55 5.0 4.44 112.6
55/56 5.25 4.53 115.9
56/57 5.25 5.34 98.3
57/58 5.25 5.04 104.2
58/59 5.25 4.95 105.8
59/60 5.25 4.89 107.4
60/61 5.375 4.94 108.8
61/62 5.625 5.36 104.9
62/63 5.625 4.93 114.1
(a) for month of June preceding announcement of
new season's guaranteed price.
(h) Source: Reserve Bank of Australia: Statistical
Bulletins I
It will be seen from this Table that on only two 
occasions during the three stabilizations did the bond yield 
exceed the rate of return allowed in the wheat costs formulae. 
On average the bond yield exceeded the latter rate by 5.6$. 
Applying the average figure to the cost of "interest" in the 
1962-63 assessment we find it represents a difference of 2d. 
to net costs per bushel.
Interest on Working Capital
In the previous Section, it was indicated that it was 
necessary to identify interest payments made in respect of 
working capital because this item presents special difficulties 
which required it to be separately computed.
For this computation it is necessary to :-
(1) define what we mean by working capital
(2) assess the level of working capital requirements
(3) assess the working capital outlay period
(4) select an appropriate rate of interest to measure 
the cost of working capital
and
(5) decide on an appropriate method of assessing 
movements in the cost of working capital between 
survey periods.
(l), (2) and (3) have already been discussed under 
the Section dealing with the evaluation of the farm asset structure.
(4) and (5) will be discussed later in this section after 
an examination of developments in the method of handling interest 
on working capital in official assessments has been made.
In the First stablilization scheme, the item was 
comprised in the two items, interest on borrowed capital and 
interest on bank advance (a cost incurred by the Wheat Board 
in borrowing funds to pay growers a first advance on their 
deliveries before their crop is sold). In effect the one 
item related to interest on outlays (l) made up to the time 
of delivery of the crop and the other to the continuing 
interest charge on the outlay up to the (average) date at 
which the crop was sold. As interest on borrowed capital (l)
(l) which were not of a capital nature.
related only to farmers’ records of actual charges incurred 
no account was taken of the cost of working capital provided 
by the farmer himself.
In the second and third stabilization schemes, the 
item, interest on borrowed capital, was as indicated above 
eliminated from cost calculations and introduced in another form 
into the item, interest on (or return to) capital. In this 
substitute calculation no allowance for interest on working capital 
was made presumably because the item, interest on bank advance, 
was taken to be an adequate allowance in this respect. If this 
were the case, then the presumption was unjustified as interest 
on bank advance bears reference to a time period subsequent to, not 
preceding, the first advance.
In 1955/56 interest on bank advance was omitted 
from the cost calculations as the Solicitor-General had 
given as his opinion that the item was not a valid cost under 
the terms of the Commonwealth and State Wheat Stabilisation Acts. 
The Wheat Cost Index Committee, however, recognised that interest 
on working capital was a legitimate production cost and accordingly 
incorporated an allowance in the cost formula for this item 
on the basis of 10/- per bushel for 12 months (estimated average 
outlay period), at 51° (the then current overdraft rate.)
However, as the item, interest on working capital, 
refers to the outlay period preceding the marketing year 
(commencing December 1st ) and interest on bank advance refers 
to the period following the commencement of the marketing 
year, the items are quite obviously not substitutes for each 
other: in fact, in that they each measure separate parts 
of the one item, viz•, interest on working capital, they are
complementary to each other. This does not imply that the 
two items combined are an accurate measure of interest on 
working capital; indeed while it is clear enough that 
either one as an overall measure is inadequate in itself, it 
is possible that the two measures combined are excessive (1) 
or would be if this net wheat cost item were associated with 
gross costs in an acceptable way.
In the third stabilization scheme, interest on working 
capital, was incorporated into the base gross cost structure 
on the basis of 10/- per bushel at for 6 months. This 
average outlay period of 6 months was chosen because calculations 
indicated that the average period between the incurring of the 
various expenses and receipt of the first advance was approximately 
6 months.
Movements in the cost of this itemwere subsequently 
measured by the overall movement in "cash" costs.
The chief objections to the above procedures are
(a) that the level of working capital requirements 
are based on an arbitrarily chosen figure of 10/- 
per bushel;
(b) that the cost was calculated on a net wheat cost 
basis viz. 10/- per bushel then incorporated into 
the gross cost structure in such a way that this 
original net cost was reduced by more than one half; 
and
(c) that the calculations fail to take the full outlay 
period into account.
As regards (a) we have indicated a preference for 
the assessment of the level of working capital balances 
required by a wheat producer by a separate calculation in (l)
(l) This is suggested by the size of the items depreciation
and return to capital.
respect of each item and for this purpose, cognisance
should he taken of all items excepting depreciation and return
on equity.
As regards (b) considerable care needs to be taken 
to ensure that gross and net costs are properly handled when 
they are brought together into a single calculation.
As regards (c), no allowance for interest on working 
capital is now made in respect of that part of the outlay 
period occurring after the first advance is made, (l)
Though it may seem to appear that interest on bank 
advance is not a valid cost of production in terms of the 
relevant Stabilization Acts, it does not follow that the 
item is not a valid cost of production in the economic sense. 
Economically speaking production costs may be identified with 
supply cost and may be defined as all costs associated with 
a commodity up to (a) the time; and (b) the geographic point 
of its sale. (b) is clear enough. As regards (a) consider, 
for example, the charges incurred by a retailer in holding 
stocks for sale: these are rightly regarded as costs, (the 
costs of producing a service) and in respect of any particular 
units of a commodity held in stock, the cost of stocking 
will only end when the particular units are sold. Likewise, the 
costs of supply (production) of wheat can only end when the 
commodity is sold.
When the Wheat Board acquires wheat from growers, it 
becomes the legal owner of the wheat. However, it does not, 
at the same time, assume responsibility for the cost including 
risk of holding stocks. These are debited to suppliers’ 
accounts. Thus, in the economic sense, the producer's supply 
or production costs do not cease to be incurred at that point 
of time at which he delivers his wheat to the Board - rather (l)
(l) A method of calculating this part of the outlay period 
was outlined in an earlier Section dealing with the 
evaluation of the level of working capital requirements.
they cease only when the wheat is sold. In view of this, 
it would appear that the item, interest on bank advances, 
is, in the economic sense, a cost of production.
The implications of such an interpretation depend 
on the intentions of the parties to the Wheat Stabilization 
Agreement. If,as it seems, the intention were to cover all 
costs of production, then producers might justly claim that 
interest on bank advances should be incorporated in the 
cost formula.
If the Minister for Primary Industry who is finally 
responsible for determining the cost of production of a 
season accepted this interpretation, it would seem that we 
should only require to ensure that it was not specifically 
invalid under the relevant Act for the Minister to authorize 
its incorporation in the cost formula.
Section (5) of the Commonwealth Wheat Industry 
Stabilization Act is directly relevant and provides as 
follows: -
" (l). For the purposes of this Act, the cost of 
production of wheat of the season commencing on the 
first day of October, One thousand nine hundred 
and fifty-eight, is Fourteen shillings and sixpence 
per bushel.
(2). For the purposes of this Act, the Minister 
shall, before the first day of December in each season 
in relation to which this Act applies, other than the 
season referred to in the last preceding sub-section, 
after consultation with the appropriate Minister 
for each State, determine an amount to be the cost 
of production of wheat of the season, and shall, 
before that day or as soon as practicable after 
that day, notify in the Gazette the amount so 
determined.
(3) • The Minister shall determine the cost of 
production on the basis of fair average quality 
bulk wheat free on rails at the ports of export.
(4) . In determining the cost of production of 
wheat of a season, the Minister shall: -
(a) take as a basis the sum fixed by 
sub-section (1) of this section as the 
cost of production of wheat of the season 
commencing on the first day of October,
One thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight; 
and
(b) make such increase or decrease in that sum 
as he considers appropriate by reason of 
increases or decreases in cost. "
It will be seen from this section of the Act, that 
costs are not rigidly defined, that no cost is specifically 
invalidated and that the Minister has discretionery power as 
to their interpretation. Accordingly, the Minister would 
seem to be free to incorporate the item in the cost formula if 
he felt this justified.
However, if the view prevailed that interest on 
bank advances could not validly be allowed as a cost under the 
Act, provision could be made in any further relevant legislation 
for an all-embracing economic definition of cost of production.
Also it might be noted, in this context, that if 
interest on bank advances cannot be justified as a valid cost 
of production in terms of the relevant Acts, neither it seems 
can other Wheat Board charges, excepting rail freight from 
sidings to ports, be so justified.
We return now to discuss items (4) and (5) mentioned 
above in connection with the assessment of the cost of working 
capital.
In the official wheat cost formula, the cost of 
working capital is calculated on the basis of the Trading 
Bank overdraft rate. As Trading Banks are the main source 
of farm borrowings, this is an appropriate rate to use. It 
could be argued of course that since farmers use their own 
resources to an important extent to finance their activities 
this component of working capital should be costed at a 
rate which compares with the prospective earning rate of 
this finance if invested elsewhere. An appropriate rate 
would, for reasons given elsewhere, be the bond rate.
However, such a rate would not be appropriate if it 
exceeded the overdraft rate, unless at the same time it could 
be unequivocally established that working capital could not 
be obtained from Trading Banks. Of course, if the bond 
rate were less than the overdraft rate, the farmer would 
unnecessarily increase his costs if he borrowed working 
capital from the Bank and invested his own funds in bonds.
The remaining matter to discuss is the method of 
measuring movements in the cost of working capital in the 
wheat cost index. Present practice is to adjust the base 
cost of working capital by the overall movement in cash 
costs. However, the cost of working capital, cet. par., 
varies with changes in the price of outlay items and changes 
in the rate of interest on borrowed funds. It appears then 
that present practice should be modified if changes in the 
cost of working capital are to be assessed as accurately 
as possible.
Owner-Operator's Allowance
Most farmers exercise the functions of labour,
management, risk bearing and ownership. Therefore, as
(1)Bellerby points out, their total revenue is compounded of 
wages or salaries, profit, interest and often rent and unless, 
as indicated earlier, each of these components of income 
represents a reasonable return in respect of its related 
productive factor, a cost-based price policy could not achieve 
its objective of reasonable returns and hence reasonable incomes 
for farmers. In other words, the allowance for a farmer's labour 
and management in a cost-based price should be determined 
independently of income accruing to him arising out of his 
equity in his farm.
The assessment of the owner operator's allowance 
will depend on the method of assessing wheat costs : if each 
farm cost item were dissected to obtain the proportion attributable 
to wheat production, it could be appropriate to assess the 
allowance in respect of wheat production only but if on the other 
hand the sideline deduction method were to be employed to allocate 
total farm costs as between wheat production and other farm 
enterprise, it would be necessary to assess the owner-operator's 
allowance in respect of the entire farm enterprise. Since the 
latter method accords with practice in the official assessment of 
wheat costs, we may usefully consider the question of the size of 
the owner operator's allowance on this basis, -his does not o± 
course imply endorsement of the sideline deduction method.
The typical farmer in Australia is the owner- 
operator who performs the functions of entrepreneur, manager 
and skilled labourer. According to Bellerby the supply price
of entrepreneurship - the readiness to work on own account and 
to assume the consequent risks - is negative because, he says, 
it is clear from common observation "that the typical risk bearer 
is not deterred from entering a field by the knowledge that .here
are less than even chances of gain, if the gain to those who 
triumph is appreciable; and the supply of such risk bearers exceeds
(1) op. cit. p.16. (2) op. cit. p. 33^•
*9.
the demand in most spheres".
bhould an allowance be made in a cost-based price 
in respect o^ this iunction? This question must be answered in 
the negative because the significant risks in farming are
eliminated under a cost-based pricing policy.
Our assessment oi the owner-operator1s allowance is 
now restricted to the functions of manager and skilled labourer.
If we take the basic wage as the starting point for this assessment 
our task is to assess the value of the farmer's skills as a 
manager and as a farm worker.
Skill margins have been defined by the Commonwealth 
Arbitration and Conciliation Commission as "minimum amounts 
awarded above the basic wage to particular classifications of 
employees for the features attaching to their work which 
justifies payment above the basic wage, whether those features 
are the skills or experience required for the performance of 
that work, its particular laborious nature, or the disabilities(i )attached to its performance.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt an 
assessment of the work value of an owner-operator for this is 
a subject which would require a special study in itself. What 
follows cannot therefore be regarded as more than fairly general 
indications of the standard of skill of farmers.
It is a well known fact that environment plays an 
enormous part in the education process. In iarming, the eilects 
of environment on education are unique in that, inter alia, 
children are exposed to and absorb farming practices from their 
infancy. The overall effect of this is so considerable that 
unlike other skilled occupations it is possible for the 
children of farmers, not having had any formal education in 
agriculture, to take over and efficiently conduct their _ather1s 
or some other farm when they reach adulthood. this does not 
imply that formal agricultural education is unnecessary; in fact,
(1) Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 46, 1960,
p.4461.
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it is most desirable as an adjunct to practical education 
particularly because of its potentially valuable productivity 
effects.
The next thing to note is that in modern farming 
communities, agricultural extension services are widespread.
These services by specially trained personnel pass on 
technical know-how to farmers and represent clear evidence of 
the greatly increased complexity of highly productive farming 
practices. This is not to say that all our farmers are 
adequately trained for their profession - clearly they are not; 
nevertheless, in the wheat industry where the advanced techniques 
of production are well known and very widely practised, a level 
of efficiency has been reached which compares favourably with the 
standard of efficiency of wheat producers in any other part of 
the world.
The 1957 survey of the wheat industry indicated that 
the average value of wheat growers’ farms was over £28,000 
(excluding house and private vehicles) and that gross income per 
farm averaged £6,700. The magnitude of these figures indicates 
a need for wheatgrowers to have financial skills as well as 
technical expertise.
Bellerby looked at farm labour skills from the point 
of view of their relationship to non-farm labour skills. He 
concluded on the basis of the results of two methods of measurement 
that on average, farm and non-farm labour are about equal in skill 
requirement. Questionnaire results used by Bellerby in his 
examination of this question indicated that from a specified list 
of skills agriculture ranks almost last with regard to (a) need 
for accuracy in measurement, design and control; (b) need to 
work from written instructions of plans and (c) responsibility for 
human life; and it is thought to be among the least subject to 
isk of disease and accident. It is near the middle of the list 
in (a) skill with tools and (b) team work, while being above the 
halfway line in respect of (a) length of training, (b) skill
with machinery, (c) judgement and self-reliance and
(d) various forms of endurance. Agriculture leads the list in
(a) responsibility for the care of materials or livestock,
(b) responsiblity for planning ahead and with shipbuilding,
(c) need to do a wide variety of jobs.
With regard to the skill margin in respect of the 
managerial function of a farmer, Bellerby says that the scarce 
qualities which are essential to a manager, but not in a 
comparable degree to a farm wage earner, may be summarized as 
the capacity to conceive the enterprise as a whole, to combine 
its various branches, to picture its potential development, to 
budget, to buy and sell with judgement, and to organize the 
movement of material and the use of manpower. He added that a 
typical farm manager's margin is 20 to 30% of the average farm 
wage (a judgment based on European and North American experience) 
and that in his view the margin could scarcely be less than 20%v .
Let us see how these figures work out in Australia.
In the absence of reliable data on average farm wages, I have 
calculated from the aware rate in New South Wales for a general 
farm hand. As at January, 1963, this comprised a basic wage of 
£15/1/- and a margin of £1/4/- for a total of £16/5/- weekly. 
Working from this figure a typical manager's salary would on 
Bellerby's figures, fall within the range of £19/10/- to 
£21/2/6 per week, (which compares with the current official 
allowance of £21/7/- weekly). One apparent weakness of this 
calculation is the margin for skill allowed in respect of a 
general farm hand. We are dealing with farmer's labour which 
requires much more skill, e.g. as indicated above, Bellerby1s view 
is that farm and non-farm labour are about equal in skill 
requirement. If, as seems reasonable, we regard the skill required 
of a fitter as being equivalent to the average skills required in 
non-farm labour occupations, we get considerably higher figures 
for the owner-operator's allowance, viz. £24/8/- to £26/9/- U'. 1 2
(1) op. cit. p.334
(2) i.e. based on a fitter's skill margin of £5/6/0 weekly.
Which of the two sets of figures is the more 
acceptable? In terms of work value, the latter set would appear 
to be. However, we have got to consider this in relation to 
the objective of policy viz., reasonable income . This we may 
define as the minimum level at which a farmer would willingly 
stay in the industry - for higher amounts new entrants would be 
attracted; for a range of lower amounts farmers would continue 
unwillingly in the industry (for reasons of occupational and 
social immobility, etc.) and at still lower amounts they would 
leave the industry.
How might an appropriate figure be assessed? There 
are few guidelines. The upper limit of the figure could be 
regarded as the level of the allowance determined on a work value 
basis (using non-farm values). The actual figure would be less 
than this amount by the value placed on farming as a way of life. 
It is not possible here to attempt an assessment of this value, 
but for the sake of illustrating its effect the purely 
hypothetical amount of £5 per week is taken. This would give, 
in relation to the second set of figures mentioned above, an
actual wage in the range £19*8.0 to £21 .9*0.
Of course, if the object of policy were to succour
an ailing industry because of its importance as an earner of 
export receipts, one should enquire whether the value placed on 
farming as a way of life might be such as would lower the actual 
monetary income of the farmer below the minimum level considered 
essential on economic grounds for satisfactory export performance. 
If, on the other hand, the object of policy were industry 
stability and reasonable incomes, as in our Vvheat industry 
stabilization schemes, it would seem appropriate to take the 
value placed on farming as a way of life into account in the 
assessment of the owner-operator's allowance.
We shall turn now to consider how the allowance
tas been determined under the Wheat Stabilization Schemes. In 
the first Scheme, the Wheat Cost of Production Committee was able 
to side step the question of a fair remuneration to the farmer, 
it being outside its terms of reference, and settle for a more
or less undefined figure that reflected the going wage rate for 
farm labourers, incorporated an allowance for the function of 
management and took into account (subjectively) the real income 
advantages and disadvantages of farm dwellers. The Committee 
considered that the average farm wage was about £5 per week plus 
keep which was valued at 25/- per week; in all £6/5/- per week. 
By setting the owner-operator's allowance at £6/10/- per week 
the Committee was in effect allowing 5/- per week for the 
managerial function, a skill margin of only b%. This margin 
apparently was not affected by the net balance of advantages and 
disadvantages of farm dwellers subjectively determined by the 
Committee; in fact, one would expect that the net balance (if 
any) would for the greater part at least also apply to farm
labourers and be reflected in their wages and thus that if the 
Committee had had some net balance figure in mind for farmers
it should have been automatically taken up in the unskilled 
component of the assessed allowance. This being so, we may
regard the k% skill margin as grossly inadequate.
In assessing the owner-operator1s allowance, the 
Committee indicated inter alia that it had not overlooked that 
a farmer seldom pays rent on his house, that local government 
rates are defrayed by the business of the farm and that farmers 
benefit from self provision of commodities produced on the farm.
Assuming that the value of the farm residence was 
excluded from the value of farm land or structures (as is 
implied and as was the case in other surveys), the cost of 
accommodation under a cost-based pricing policy would fall on 
the personal earnings of the producer. We have seen that in 
this situation the personal earnings of the producer should be 
based on the earning rate for comparable labour and management 
in industry. Moreover, if farmers do not generally pay a rent 
on their farm house, this means that they must have committed 
financial resources for the full payment of the house and in 
consequence they now forgo the income these resources might
otherwise have earned. It follows that nobody would want to 
pay off a housing loan if reduced income were to be the 
consequence.
The farm residence component of local government 
rates and taxes which the Committee indicated were included 
in farm costs could hardly be expected to be of much significance 
because of the isolation of these residence from local government 
services.
As regards self-provision on farms, the "unearned" 
component of this may be taken to be equal to the at-farm value 
of the produce less the value of the farmer's labour.
On the one hand this recognises that farm costs 
are loaded with the costs of producing produce consumed on 
the farm and on the other hand that farmers work longer hours 
than the standard hours worked by urban workers whose earnings 
provide the bases for assessing an equitable allowance for 
owner-operators in respect of cost-based prices for farm products.
These extra hours worked may justifiably be regarded in the same 
light as the backyard activities in fruit, vegetables, poultry 
and eggs of urban workers.
In the second Wheat Stabilization Scheme, the 
owner-operator's allowance was brought into line with the 
allowance used in assessing dairy costs. The basic wage 
component of this was adjusted each year in accordance with 
movements in the basic wage.
In respect of the first year of the third 
Stabilization Scheme, the Government accepted an industry figure 
of £1,040 as the owner-operator's allowance. This amount is 
the annual equivalent of £20 per week which corresponded to 
average weekly earnings per employed male unit in non-rural 
occupations in 1958 when the third scheme commenced/1 ^
(1) C.B.C.S.: Monthly review of Business
April, 1963•
Statistics,
AA5%
The allowance is adjusted by the precise amount of any 
changes in the basic wage.
This basis for assessing the owner-operator1s 
allowance has behind it the principle of income parity as 
between the farm and non-farm groups and, in effect it means 
that the Government regards income parity, as being synonymous 
with its reasonable income criterion. It therefore appears 
that it is intended that income parity should be defined as 
equal pay in respect of occupations demanding equivalent levels 
of skill. However, so defined, income parity does not imply 
identity between average weekly earnings in manufacturing industry 
and average work value of wheat growers for clearly average weekly 
earnings may reflect higher or lower average levels of skill than 
wheat growers possess. Average weekly earnings also reflect 
overtime payments and thus overstate basic earning rates in 
industry. On the other hand to the extent that they do not 
contain an adequate managerial component, average weekly 
earnings understate income parity for farmers. Average weekly 
earnings are therefore a balance of various considerations not 
all relevant to the issue in hand.
If we interpret the criterion of reasonable income 
as work value less the value placed on farming as a way of life 
it appears that the government is achieving its income objective 
for wheatgrowers although it might well be said that the 
yardstick (average weekly earnings in industry) used to reach this 
objective only happens to provide an appropriate indication by
accident.
Farm Labour
The 1957/58 Wheat Industry Survey revealed the 
overwhelming importance of the owner-operator on the one 
hand, and family members on the other, as sources of farm 
labour. 42$. of survey farms were conducted by the owner- 
operator employing for the greater part only casual labour.
A further 50$ of farms were conducted solely by family labour 
arrangements (partnership, sharefarmer or simply family 
labour).(1 )
The labour of the owner-operator has been separately 
considered. The only problem connected with hired labour is 
to separate wage payments in respect of development work from 
wage payments directly connected with productive activity.
Family labour and sharefarmers' activities provide additional 
problems. The direct remuneration of family labour bears 
little relation to its real value because apart from income 
in kind (e.g. board and lodging) the reward to this class of 
labour is, in an important degree, on the basis of profit 
sharing or future capital deed.(2; The special problem with 
sharefarmers is the difficulty of identifying their costs.
To ensure that labour costs were accurately assessed, 
data were collected in four categories, viz., routine farm 
work, harvest work,•development work and off-farm work. In 
respect of family labour, data were also collected on each 
type of labour unit (adults being classified by sex and juniors 
by sex and age) and the time actually worked by each Oi -nese 
units. These labour inputs were uhen costed at aware rates.
The same procedure was followed in respect of sharefarmers' 
labour. Other costs borne by the sharefarmer were of course 
included in farm pro due bion co ^ u s. 1 2
(1) b.a.E.: The Australian Wheatgrowing Industry: An 
Economic Survey, p. 15•
(2) ibid p.8
As regards the measurement of movements in labour 
costs over the course of a Stabilization Scheme, the current 
practice is to vary the survey data by the percentage changes 
in State Awards where they apply (in N.S.W., Victoria, and 
W.A.) or otherwise changes in State Basic Wages (in S.A. 
and Q*ld.) The base cost determined for harvest labour is 
adjusted from year to year by movements in Harvest Awards 
where they exist. This practice introduces a formal anomaly 
into the costing procedures since the base cost of harvest 
labour includes permanent hired labour and family labour 
which were costed at award rates for permanent employees.
Harvest labour should be split up to show separately 
casual labour hired for harvesting work and permanent labour 
engaged in harvesting work. Assessed movements in the costs of 
these items should then be based on the movements in their 
respective award rates. However, for all practical purposes, 
the present procedure can be accepted as providing sufficiently 
accurate results.
It might also be noted that harvesting costs are 
understated because of the omission of the cost of the owner- 
operator 's harvesting work: this of course does not affect 
aggregate costs because of its inclusion in the owner-operator * s 
allowance.
It may therefore be concluded that farm labour 
production costs are accurately assessed in the costing procedures.
Depreciation
There are four main classes of farm assets which 
should be considered in relation to depreciation. These 
are (i) land and improvements; (ii) structures; (iii) plant 
and (iv) livestock.
In wheat cost assessments, it is assumed that 
categories (i) and (iv) are non-depreciable assets. In 
the sense of their physical capacity to produce a given 
output, this is reasonable since there is no user cost 
arising out of the productive use of these assets if they 
are properly managed and it would be an irresponsible policy 
that would allow losses due to mismanagement as costs of 
production.
As regards land, proper crop rotations combined 
with appropriate applications of fertilizers arising out of 
basic deficiencies in the soil, will prevent physical 
deterioration of the soil.
As regards livestock, the position is quite different 
but the result is the same. Consider for example a flock of 
sheep. The object of flock management is, inter alia, to 
maintain an equilibrium flock structure, i.e. defined numbers 
of each type in each age group. Insofar as this is achieved, 
there is no change in the flock structure and, cet. par., the 
value of this asset in the sense of its physical capacity 
remains unchanged over time. In effect, the average unit 
value of sheep in the flock, cet. par., remains unchanged.
This is akin to the trees in the forest analogy with which 
Alfred Marshall explained his theory of the growth and' decay 
of firms and the existence of a representative firm.
In arriving at these conclusions that there is no 
user cost in the proper productive use of land and livestock, 
it should be made clear that this does not mean that these 
assets cannot change in value for other reasons. Indeed
they can and do. The value of land is affected by the prices 
being received for the commodities it is capable of producing 
whilst the value of sheep is affected by changes in the prices 
of the products derived from sheep. For example, if land 
and livestock values decline because of a decline in prices 
of the commodities produced by these assets, this must be 
recognized as a decline in (derived) demand for these assets 
and not as a user cost.
These matters have been discussed elsewhere and 
are mentioned here merely to sharpen the distinction between 
changes in value as a result of demand forces and changes 
(declines) in value as a result of wear and tear through 
productive use.
We turn now to discuss the assessment of depreci­
ation of structures and plant. As indicated earlier structures 
are now valued on the basis of replacement cost less depreci­
ation. Depreciation was calculated by the straight line 
method which means that the annual depreciation charge on an 
asset was constant throughout its life. The rates of 
depreciation used were the standard rates^ applied by the 
Taxation Department prior to the introduction early in the 
1950’s of the special 20fo tax rates.
Perhaps the main problem in the costing of 
depreciation has been the measurement of change over the 
course of a stabilization scheme. Present practice is to 
measure change by depreciation indexes. These indexes (one 
for plant and one for structures) are based on the assumption 
that equal quantities of these assets are worn out and 
replaced each year. This being so, price variation is the 
only way through which the value of depreciation can change.
It follows from this that an index of value of depreciation 
can be derived from an appropriate price index series. The
(l) As set out in Income Tax Order 1217 of 1950.
index of value of depreciation of an asset is simply given 
by the summation of its related price index for the number 
of years it takes to fully depreciate. It is assumed that 
on average, items of plant take 10 years to wear out while 
all structures taken together have an average life of 40 
years1
In effect the method assesses movements in the cost 
of depreciation in terms of the original cost of the assets 
involved. This would mean that in periods of inflation 
depreciation in real terms would be understated, and vice 
versa. This deficiency could be simply overcome by using 
the price indexes to indicate movements in the current 
replacement cost of assets on the basis that the replacement 
cost of an asset purchased X years ago is the same as the 
replacement cost of a similar asset purchased Y years ago.
The change in the cost of depreciation in real terms (which 
for our purposes means current values) is then given by the 
ratio of the index in the year "n" to the index in year "n-1" 
where year "n" is the current year.
This procedure is desirable in respect of both plant 
and structures, it being irrelevant to the proper measure of 
the cost of depreciation that plant is valued for other 
purposes on the basis of original cost.
We may next enquire whether the assumption that 
equal quantities of plant and structures are worn out and 
replaced each year is valid when we know that the tendency 
is for increased investment per farm in real terms in these 
assets.
An increase in net farm investment would be expected 
to have its productive response which, cet. par., would leave 
unchanged or lower unit costs, otherwise the investment would not 
be undertaken. For this reason it would not be realistic to 
reflect new investment in costs without also taking into account
the consequential effect on output. It follows that as no 
adjustment is made in respect of the latter between one survey 
and the next no adjustment should be made with respect to 
new investment between surveys.
It would appear then that the assumption does 
provide as reasonable a basis as possible for assessing 
movements in costs of depreciation; that is to say, it is an 
acceptable and essential part of the price index structure 
which is required to up-date survey data to the current season.
Seed Wheat
In the base cost structure of the third stabilization 
scheme, the cost of seed wheat was calculated by estimating the 
quantity used on the basis of the common sowing rate of one 
bushel per acre. The usage figures so derived were then costed 
at the previous season's net cost at sidings figure plus an 
adjustment of 2$ to cover freight charges and wheat purchased at 
premium prices.
This, in principle, is a good procedure as recorded data 
is unreliable due to the fact that many farmers do not have adequate 
records of seed wheat usage. However, one is justified in objecting 
to the costing of seed wheat on the basis of the net cost at sidings 
figure. This figure is about 7d. above the net "at farm" cost which 
would be, theoretically, a more acceptable figure. If this figure 
were used, it would then be valid to make an upwards adjustment in 
in respect of seed wheat purchased off the farm. As the procedure 
stands now, however, the upward adjustment for freight is not valid 
although that part of the 2$ relating to the added cost of premium 
seed wheat is.
For the purpose of costing seed wheat in the base cost, 
the net cost at-sidings figures used were adjusted for yield; whereas 
they were originally determined on the basis of a 13.5 bushel yield 
figure they were recalculated on the basis of a 15.0 bushel yield 
figure (which corresponded more closely with actual trends) in the 
base cost calculation of seed wheat. This is an objectionable 
practice in theory since the original net costs at-sidings figures 
became in effect the guaranteed price at sidings for wheat. The 
at-farm equivalent of this price was, therefore, the real cost of 
seed wheat to the farmer - indeed in cases where he sold his own 
wheat and purchased his seed wheat this is the price he actually paid.
In each year of the stabilization scheme, the cost of seed 
wheat is adjusted according to the percentage change in net cost of 
production at-sidings for the previous crop year. This is a logical 
procedure since "this" year's seed wheat was produced at "last" 
year's prices.
Other Costs
The remaining cost items are those incurred costs 
that appear familiarly in farmers' tax records, viz., 
fertilizer, maintenance, fuel, rates and taxes, insurance, 
cartage, cornsacks, etc.
The practice is to sift through these items to 
eliminate any elements of developmental or personal expenditur 
occurring therein. For example, it is frequently found that 
large amounts of material included under maintenance items 
tire really replacement capital expenditures. Such expenditures 
are eliminated from costs. The cost of seed and fertilizer 
used to lay down a new pasture is also treated as a capital 
expenditure and eliminated. Though the practice has no 
significance in terms of wheat costs, it is worth pointing out 
that on theoretical grounds this procedure might not always 
"be sound. For example if regular and roughly equal applicatio 
of fertilizer were to "be made to pastures each year, the 
expenditure involved would then be a valid cost of production.
When incurred costs have been adjusted to exclude 
developmental expenditure the only remaining problem in 
dealing with these items is to devise suitable price indexes 
for estimating movements in theircosts over the course of a 
stabilization scheme.
As each cost group (elsewhere called item), with 
the exception of "miscellaneous" which represents a heterogene 
group of small items, covers a somewhat homogeneous collection 
of items, there is a marked tendency for the prices of the 
items within each group to move in step with each other.
The significance of this is that difficulties associated 
with the precise weighting of these items do not lead to any 
serious compromise with accuracy in measuring the overall 
price movements of each group.
ihe existing bases for estimating these movements 
are discussed "below.
Fertilizer
On wheat farms, fertilizer consists almost entirely 
of superphosphate. For this reason, movements in the price 
of superphosphate (at sidings basis) have been used to measure 
movements in the cost of this item. Superphosphate prices 
are collected on an F.O.R. "at works" basis and are converted 
to an "at sidings" basis by an addition for rail freight 
which is based on modal rail distances to wheat regions and 
rail freight rates for fertilizer. This procedure despite 
its shortcuts seems justified on the basis that further 
refinement in the calculations would be most unlikely to 
significantly change the results.
As the price of superphosphate varies between States
and as some States are relatively more important than others
as users of superphosphate, it is necessary to weight the
State prices to get an acceptable average price. For this
purpose, the current season's (estimated) wheat acreages are
(1)used as weights' . The resulting price index is of the form 
W1 P1-u- pQ where W1 represents current wheat acreages, P1 the 
current season's price of superphosphate and Po the previous 
season's price.
The use of current weights in this index calculation 
could only be regarded as providing a better measure of 
changes in cost than a base-weighted index if there were good 
reasons for taking the current year to be the normal year 
or the only relevant year in terms of cost-based prices: 
these reasons are not however apparent. 1
(1) It is not possible to use these data as weights to
re-assess the level of the base cost of the item itself 
because we should then also require to know the relevant 
production figures and other changes resulting from a 
change in farm type.
Maintenance of Machinery
Movements in the cost of maintenance of machinery are 
based on movements in the prices of 89 parts which are most 
frequently replaced in machines used on wheat farms. These 
price movements are combined into an overall figure by taking 
the simple average of the individual price relatives. This 
is a long way short of a precise calculation: the coverage is 
small and the use of a simple average is suspect. However as 
time and cost limit the collection and processing of data this 
procedure is probably justified on the ground of expediency 
combined with an adequate order of accuracy.
Maintenance of Structures
A weighted regimen consisting of basic building and 
fencing materials most used by farmers has been used to assess 
movements in the cost of this item. Though the weights which 
are based on a small sample of growers are probably suspect, 
the index most probably yields a sufficiently reliable figure 
in terms of the relative importance of the item, as there is 
some tendency for sympathetic movement in the prices of items 
in the regimen.
Fuel and Oil
To measure the movement in the cost of this item 
price data in respect of certain fuels and lubricants in six 
representative wheat belt towns in each of the four main 
producing States are collected and combined into an aggregative 
index by a system of weights.
The weights were built up as follows: - the relative 
weightings of kerosene and distillate were derived from a sample 
of farmers selected at random from the Wheat Cost of Production 
Committee's survey schedules. The other weights were estimated 
on the basis of the relationship of lubricant usage to fuel 
consumption for a 25 h.p. tractor under average conditions.
The weight for petrol was based on an estimate of its 
importance in relation to the other fuels. This weight 
(for petrol) was reviewed and increased in the 1949/50 wheat 
cost assessment. The weights calculated have applied unchanged 
since that year.
An obvious criticism of the weighting system is that 
iwas not reviewed in the light of the results of subsequent 
surveys, notwithstanding that farm mechanization is known to 
have continued at a fast rate in the period since the weights 
were first calculated.
In addition the practice of collecting price data 
from six wheat belt towns in each State without regard to their 
relative importance would seem to warrant reconsideration in 
view of the policies of the oil industry of pricing its products 
on a strictly defined regional basis.
Rates and Taxes
Movements in the cost of rates and taxes, the main
component of which is shire rates, are measured in the following
way: data are collected from shire clerks on rateable values and
average rates payable in wheat growing areas, from these data
State totals of rates assessed are calculated and the relative
given by the current year's to the previous year's total rates is
determined. The relatives for each State are then combined, by
weighting them by the estimated areas sown to wheat in the current
1 1 •seas in an index of the form P__W * this gives a CommonwealthPO W1
relative which is taken as the measure of the overall movement in 
the cost of rates and taxes.
Insurance
The main types of farm insurance are crop, fire, workers' 
compensation, and motor vehicle (comprehensive and third party) 
insurance. Outside of structural changes on farms and apart 
from decisions to increase or decrease insurance coverage, the 
cost of insurance varies according to changes in insurable values 
and/or insurance rates.
/p -
Data on changes in insurance rates are obtained 
from underwriters. These rates are converted into price 
relatives and weighted by current wheat acreages to yield an 
average rate for the main wheat producing states.
Changes in insurable values were obtained in the 
following way: the changes in the maximum insurable value 
allowed by the insurance companies per bushel of wheat is used 
to measure the changes in crop values. The change in the 
value of plant is given by the Index of Capital Values of 
Plant and the change in the value of structures is given by 
the Index of Capital Values of Structures.^^ As workers' 
compensation premiums are affected by changes in wage rates, 
the average of the price relatives for harvest labour and "other" 
labour is used to measure the effect of wage rate changes on 
these premiums.
The change in the cost of insurance is calculated 
by applying (in turn) to each of the insurance items the 
weighted relatives of the (five States) average of insurance 
rates and the relatives of the capital value of insured items. 
These calculations have an obvious air of thoroughness about 
them: they cover the main categories of farm insurance and 
allow for the effects of changes in both insurable values and 
insurance rates. 1
(1) Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Canberra.
The mechanics of the tabulation in respect of the 
year 1962/63 are shown in the following table:-
INSURANCE
Type of Insurance
Sub-Index 
1961-62
ts
Weighted 
Relative 
for Ins. 
Rates 
(5 States) 
*
Relative 
f or Ins. 
Values
*
Sub-Index 
1962-63
*
Crop
Motor Vehicle -
40.7 108.5 102.6 45.3
(a) Third Party 11.4 109.2 100.0 12.4
(Id) Comprehensive 11.9 100.0 102.7 12.2
Fire 24.7 100.0 104.1 25.7
Workers' Compensation 11.3 102.9 99.7 11.6
Price Relative (Aust.) 100.0 107.2
Cornsacks
Cornsack prices are different in each State.
Accordingly, it is necessary to calculate an overall price
W1 PIeach season. This is calculated using the formuls ^-p- where
W1 represents estimated production in the current year, PI 
the price of sacks in the current year and Po the price in 
the previous year.
The production weights used in this calculation 
need not necessarily reflect the relative usage of cornsacks 
by States because a very considerable proportion of the crop is 
now delivered in bulk - they also fail to take account of 
recent trends in this regard. However possible errors &n these 
accounts are probably minimal because the prices in the various 
states are closely related and tend to move together.
Cartage
As identified in the official gross cost structure 
of the industry, this item refers only to wheat cartage.
More specifically it refers to wheat cartage costs on those 
survey farms whose records enabled it to be separately 
identified. As only relatively few wheat producers who get 
their wheat carted have separate cartage cost figures available, 
this cost item is considerably understated, i.e. for the 
greater part the cost of this item is included in other items.
And as an indication of the average cartage cost of wheat per 
bushel the item is even more inaccurate because a high 
proportion of growers cart wheat in their own vehicles." y
Measuring the movement in the cost of the item as it 
stands is achieved thus: data on cartage rates are obtained 
from State Road Hauliers' Associations and combined, using 
estimates of current production as weights, into an overall 
Commonwealth figure. It could be argued here that the 
weights do not reflect possible changes in the utilization of 
commercial carriers. However the item is so small that the 
effects of any such changes would be insignificant,
Rent on Crown Land Held on Perpetual Lease
Land held on perpetual lease from the Crown was not 
taken into consideration in the valuation of farm assets for 
the purpose of assessing return to capital (discussed earlier). 
This land was costed on the basis of rentals actually paid.
The procedure is supported although for presentational purposes 
it might have been tabulated under the item, return to farm
capital.____ -__ _______ _ ■ - ----------------------- *---------------
m An unpublished study of cartage costs by A.E. Cox, Bureau
K J f Agricultural Economics, based on the 1957 wheat survey 
results indicates, inter alia, that in N.S.W. 507° of 
wheat producers deliver in their own vehicles; of the 
remainder, many did not have separate wheat cartage records. 
a1=o as indicated elsewhere, Cox assessed the true cost of 
cartage at about 7d, per bushel; this compares with a 
figure of approximately Id. per bushel in the official 
cost figures.
Movements in the cost of this item were for some 
years based on the proportion of leases being re-assessed 
each year and the change in rentals arising out of this 
re-assessment.
In the third stabilisation scheme this item was 
held unchanged in respect of each year's assessment. This 
procedure is apparently dictated by the minor nature of change 
in the item and its relative insignificance. Ideally of 
course adjustments ought to be made.
Miscellaneous
This item covers a miscellany of individually small 
cost items, e.g. postage, telephone charges, bank charges, 
subscriptions to organisations, accountants' fees, woolpack 
and shearing costs, taken from the farmer's tax returns. 
Movements in the cost of this item are based on the overall 
movement in the other items in the gross cost structure 
excluding interest on working capital. This exclusion has 
no justification on theoretical grounds nor does it appear 
to have any practical significance.
As miscellaneous costs aggregate about 8$ of total 
gross costs, it is always worth while reviewing the basis of 
measuring cost movements, in the item. It might be possible 
for example to separate out further items, movements in the 
cost of which could be measured by a closely related price 
index. Some possible items for consideration for this sort 
of treatment are woolpacks, shearing costs and p:; esticides.
It is difficult to assess the appropriateness of 
using the movement in the main items of the gross cost index 
as a measure of cost movements of the miscellaneous items; 
it might be said however, that it does seem somewhat unusual
that movements in this index, which has no components common 
to the miscellaneous group, should be regarded as the best 
indicator available.
This brings us to the end of our discussion on the 
individual cost items contained within the Wheat Cost of 
Production Index. There is, however, another composite item, 
which is directly related to the guaranteed price - namely, 
rail freight from sidings to ports and Wheat Board handling 
charges. This item is discussed below.
Rail Freight and Wheat Board Handling Charges
Wheat cost of production figures based on survey 
data are calculated on an "at sidings" basis, i.e. no costs 
wholly external to the farm are accounted for in the cost 
formula. However, under the Wheat Stabilization Act, prices 
are guaranteed on an "f.o.r. ports" basis. It is therefore 
necessary for the cost assessment to be on the same basis.
Present practice in this regard is to add to the 
assessed "at sidings" cost figure, the Wheat Board's estimates 
of rail freight (from sidings to ports) and handling charges 
(excluding interest on bank advances). Handling charges includ 
storage, administration and special road transport or generally 
every cost incurred by 'the Wheat Board in receiving, storing 
and selling wheat of a season.
In effect, the f.o.r. ports figure is determined by 
adding to the computed at-sidings cost (based on average or. 
expected yields as weights) the actual rail freight per bushel 
(i.e. based on actual yields as weights).
This procedure raises the question whether it is 
theoretically possible to get a meaningful result by adding 
together two figures which were calculated on the basis of 
different sets of weights.
If there were an increase in the proportion of 
production coming from regions with higher than average 
freight costs per bushel, present calculations would indicate 
a rise in costs; actual costs, however, might rise or fall - 
they would rise if the national average yield declined and 
fall if the national average yield increased (i.e. over and 
above the very small increase required to offset the rise in 
average freight costs per bushel). These results arise 
because in general farmers' outlays (except for harvesting, 
cartage, and rail freight) tend to be the same for all yields 
so that when yields are below normal, unit costs are above 
normal and vice versa.
The same "mixed" results obtain if we consider an 
increase or decrease in the proportion of production coming 
from regions with lower than average freight costs per 
bushel; or a decrease in the proportion of production coming 
from regions with higher than average freight costs per 
bushel.
In other words there is only a 50i° probability that 
the present procedure would give a better approximation to 
the true position than would be given if average or expected
yields were used in the calculation of the cost of rail
„ • *,+ (1)freight. 1
(1) This is the main charge paid by the Wheat Board on behalf 
of growers; other Board charges, cet. par,, tend to rise 
or fall on a per bushel basis according as the volume 
of deliveries is lower or higher than normal.
Conceptually, therefore, there does not seem to be 
any advantage in the present method of using actual yields 
in respect of rail freight costs, the more so perhaps as they 
are only estimates. On the other hand, the use of estimates 
of actual costs in respect of other Wheat Board charges which 
tend to vary directly, on a unit basis, with the volume of 
deliveries, would seem to be entirely justified.
As regards rail freight it might be concluded that 
if our policy objective were to ensure that income over a 
period of years averaged out at a reasonable level, we could 
properly base our calculation of the rail freight charge 
(together with the at-sidings cost index figures) on expected 
yields.
?a-a-.
A Form of Summary
No attempt has been ma.de to quantify the effects of the various 
suggestions ma.de for improving the cost assessments because although we 
have found that the calculation of sideline cost in the cost formula is 
unacceptable, it has not been possible to make any substitute calcula­
tions.
However, to provide a form of summary of our findings the various 
other items have been categorised hereunder in respect of the first 
three stabilization schemes according as they are considered to have 
been under-priced or over-priced in the respective cost formulae.
First Stabilization Scheme:-
Items underpriced:
Interest on capital in respect of valuation of land, plant, structures,
livestock and working capital.
Owner-operator*s allowance.
Depreciation.
Seed.
Family labour.
(Cost of self provision on farms - as an offset to wheat costs - not 
taken into account).
Items overpriced:
Interest on capital - interest rate slightly high.
Second Stabilization Scheme
Items underpriced:
Interest on capital in respect of valuation of land, plant, structures
and livestock.
Interest on working capital - no allowance made.
Depreciation.
Seed.
(Cost of self provision on farms - as an offset to wheat costs - not 
taken into account).
Items overpriced:
Interest on capital - interest rate too high.
Third Stabilization Scheme:- 
Items underpriced:
Interest on capital in respect of valuation of plant and structures. 
Interest on working capital.
Depreciation.
(Cost of self provision on farms - an offset to wheat costs - not taken 
into account).
Items overpriced:
Seed.
Interest on capital - interest rate too high.
In addition to the foregoing the use of unrealistically low yield 
divisors to obtain unit costs in respect of each scheme introduced an 
element of over-pricing in cost items in general.
mAPPENDIX I
Table 1 : FIRST WHEAT INDUSTRY STABILISATION SCHEME 
GROSS COST STRUCTURE AND NET WHEAT COST
Item
1947-45
d.
per
bush.
1W
d.
per
bush.
"1949-50
d.
per 
bush.
.1950-51
d.
per
bush.
'■'"T9V1-92
d.
per
bush.
~W52=r5
a.
per
bush.
Labour
Farmer1s 22.80 24.38 26.31 28.24 38.68 48.37Harvest 4.62 5.35 5.78 7.26 8.96 10.35Other 4.62 5.01 5.49 5.97 8.18 9.82
Maintenance
Machinery 5.23 5.95 6.03 6.87 8.62 9.70
Structures 2.81 2.97 3.39 4.68 7.46 8.32
Depreciation 7.58 7.58 8.21 8.76 9.24 10.12
Fuel 12.48 14.43 14.88 16.59 18.73 21.88
Interest
Borrowed capital 5.28 5.28 4.97 3.21 2.10 1.85
Farmers’ equity 13.08 13.08 13.33 14.76 18.75 19.18
Fertilizer 4.32 4.82 5.27 5.97 7.96 11.76
Cornsacks 1.50 1.62 1.78 2.14 3.73 3.74
Seed 5.16 5.52 5.91 6.24 6.84 8.54
Rates and Taxes 2.19 2.50 2.73 3-20 3.42 4.30
Insurance 1.53 1.53 1.65 1.85 2.19 2.46
Cartage 1.80 1.96 2.11 2.48 2.96 3.48
Rent 1.80 1.80 1.80 2.00 2.22 2.47
Miscellaneous 2.16 2.16 2.28 2.50 3.11 3.94
Total gross farm
cost (at sidings) 98.96 105.94 111.92 122.72 153.15 180.28
Net cost (at sidings) 65.00 69.57 73.51 80.'6o 100.59 118.39
Rail freight and 
handling charges 10.00 10.46 11.50 13.53 19.29 24.36
Total net cost, bulk
basis, f,.o .r. ports | 75.00 80.03 85.01 94.13 119.88 l 142.75
Table 2 : SECOND WHEAT INDUSTRY STABILISATION SCHEME
GROSS COST STRUCTURE AND NET WHEAT COST
1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58
Item d. d. d. d. d.per per per per per
bush. bush. bush. bush. bush.
Labour
Parmer's 42.14 42.14 42.14 43.28 44.41
Harvest 14.77 14.77 15.17 15.79 16,07
Other 17.59 17.59 17,82 18.62 19.14
Maintenance 
Machinery 17.01 16.86 18.28 19.60 20.11
Structures 6.43 6.62 7.27 7.68 7.84
Depreciation 20.73 22.20 23.69 25.30 27.05
Fuel 18.03 15.33 17.04 18.40 18.73
Return (interest) 
Farm Capital
on
33.20 34.10 35.05 37.85 38.87
Fertilizer 15.04 12.57 12.53 12.86 13.63
Cornsacks 3.37 2. 12 2.15 2.15 2.34
Seed 8.95 9.26 9.18 9.44 9.95
Rates and Taxes 3.56 3.83 4.17 4.51 4.83
Insurance 3.77 3.48 3.61 3.88 4.16
Cartage 3.56 3.56 3.76 4.06 4.11
Rent 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13
Miscellaneous 12.20 11.86 12.54 13.22 13.68
Total gross farm 
costs Cat sidings) 221.48 219.42 225.53 237.77 246.05
Net costs (at
sidings) 124.83 123.71 127.17 134.04 138.73
Rail freight and 
handling charges 
Total net costs, 
bulk basis, f.o.r. 
ports
25.83 27.34 29.44 29.99 31.32
150.66 151.05 156.61 164.03 170.05
Table 3 s THIRD WHEAT INDUSTRY STABILIZATION SCHEME
GROSS COST STRUCTURE AND NET WHEAT COST
Item
1958-59
d.
per
bush.
1959-60
d.
per
bush.
1960-61
d.
per
bush.
1961-62
d,
per
bush.
1962-63
d.
per
bush.
Labour
Farmer's 45.66 47.40 47.40 48.77 48.77
Harvest 3.28 3.38 3.54 3.63 3.62
Other 25.03 25.58 26.53 27.49 27o38
Maintenance
Machinery 22.89 23.32 23.83 24.40 24.67
Structures 5.15 5.22 5.48 5.51 5.53
Depreciation 45.18 47.76 50.10 52.50 54.44
Fuel 21.09 20.84 20.67 20.26 19.94
Return (interest on 
Farm Capital 67.18 68.39 71.13 75.68 76.82
Fertilizer 15.24 14.05 13.99 14.06 14.09
Comsacks 5.08 4.77 6.20 6.83 6.32
Seed 8.42 8.68 8.85 9.13 9.49
Rates and Taxes 6.37 6.56 7.08 7.84 8.36
Insurance 5.72 5.84 6.10 6.26 6.71
Cartage 1.08 1.11 1.16 1.17 1.17
Rent 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0o7 6
Interest on Working
Capital 3.15 3.16 3.27 3.36 3. |
Miscellaneous 25.79 26.31 27.15 28.21 28.55
Total gross farm 
costs (at sidings) 307.07 313.13 323.24 335.86 340.00
Net costs (at 
sidings) 147.78 150.74 155.56 161.63 163.57
Rail freight and 
handling charges 26.22 26.89 26.62 27.33 26.64
Total net costs, 
bulk basis, f.o.r. 
ports 174.00 177.63 182.18 188.96 190.21
APPENDIX II
DERIVATION OF BASE COST FOR THIRD WHEAT INDUSTRY STABILISATION
SCHEME (1958/59 TO 1962/63)
Basic Farm Characteristics
Following an examination of the data from the 1957 
wheat survey, it was decided to assess wheat costs for 
stabilization purposes on the basis of data from wheat farms 
with 30$ or more income from wheat. The basic characteristics 
of this class in the survey sample were as follows:
No. of farms
Total area sown to wheat in 
i ears (1954-55, 1955-56
214
227,001 acres
Total production in survey years
Average yield per acre in survey years
Average area sown to wheat per farm
Average production per farm
Average farm size
Average wheat income
Average sideline income
Average total income
Average $ wheat income
Average sheep numbers
4,212,262 bushels
818
353.58 acres 
6,561 bushels 
2,081 acres 
£3,341 
£3,503 
£6,844 
48.8$
18.556 bushels
The main cost components of survey wheat 
30$ or more income from wheat are given below.
farms with
GROSS COST COMPONENTS 1954-55 TO 1956-57
Materials 1,237,065
Less Seed Wheat 
(actual cost) 13?090
Add Seed Wheat
Total
£
70.48
0.75
Per Bushel
d.
(imputed cost) 109.804 1,333,779 6.26 75.99
Services 180,931 10.31
Wheat Cartage 16,724 0.95
Depreciation 545,770 31.10
Labour cost
Return (interest)
1,009,689 57.53
on Farm Capital 876,555 49.94
Total Gross Cost 3,963,448 225.82
Determination of Net Wheat Cost (l) by Sideline Deduction Method
Sideline income £3503 = l'q-q1 of Sideline Cost "by assumption (2)
Therefore Sideline cost = -yy of £3503 = £3184.5
£3184.5 = £0.485368 = 116.48d. ( 3)
6 561 1 2 3
(1) This net wheat cost is known as the Base Cost which is 
specified in the Wheat Stabilization Act for the purposes 
of the third Stabilisation Scheme which commenced in
1958/59.
(2) i.e. implying a 10^ profit on sales.
(3) official figure; actually 116.49d.
Z57
FARM COSTS IN SURVEY PERIOD INDEXED FORWARD TO 1957-58
(based on Survey Yield of 18.6 bushels per acre)
1954/55 to 1956/57 Price 1957/58
averaged/bush. Relative1° d/bush
Gross Farm Costs 225.82 109.5(a) 109.5^ ' 247.27Sideline Costs 116.48 127.54
Net Costs 109.34 119.73
(a) Gross costs increased by 9.5% over the period
and on the assumption that there was no (significant) 
structural change, sideline costs were increased in 
the same proportion.
These assessed costs were then converted to a 15.5 bushel yield 
basis as this was the official yield figure decided upon for 
the third stabilization scheme. Thus;
1957/58 Assessed Costs on Yield Basis of 15.5 Bushels/Acre
1957/58
(18.6 bush basis) 
d/bush.
Conversion
factor
1957/58 
(15.5 bush 
basis) d/bush
Items constant for 
yield
Other gross costs
Sideline Costs
Rail Freight and 
Handling Charges
9.77 100.0 (a)237.50
247.27
120.0
(a)127.54 120.0
119.73
Net Costs f.o.r. ports
9 .77
285 .00
294 .77
153 .05
141 .72
31 .05
172 .77
(a) 'i8.6 
T5T5 x 100 = 120
The 1958/59 base cost (H/6d.) was obtained directly 
from the 1957/58 figures (as above determined) oy the method 
of indexing the 1957/58 g-oss cost structure forward and 
applying the resulting overall movement to the net cost at 
sidings figure of 141.72d. and adding on estimated rail 
freight and handling charges.
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